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FROM SUSPICION TO SUSTAINABILITY IN
GLOBAL SUPPLY CHAINS
By: Robert C. Bird* & Vivek Soundararajan**
ABSTRACT
Global supply chains power 80% of world trade, but also host widespread
environmental, labor, and human rights abuses in developing countries. Most
scholarship focuses on some form of sanction to motivate supply chain members, but we propose that the fundamental problem is not insufficient punishment, but a lack of trust. Fickle tastes, incessant demands for lower prices, and
spot market indifference force suppliers into a constant struggle for economic
survival. No trust can grow in such an environment, and few sustainability
practices can take meaningful root. Responding to multiple calls for scholarship in the supply chain literature, we propose a trust-building process by
which supply chains can evolve from indifference and hostility to a relational
partnership that produces joint investments in sustainable practices. The result
is a supply chain that is more efficient, more humane, and embeds sustainability in the supply chain for the long-term.
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Global supply chains power 80% of world trade, 60% of global production, and sustain over 450 million jobs.1 While global supply chains
can generate efficiencies,2 they can also encourage a variety of harmful and unsustainable practices. Workers are subjected to dangerous
working conditions, weak labor rights, violence, and torture.3 They
often subsist in poverty or are even enslaved in forced labor.4 Many of
the underlying problems that caused 1,134 Bangladeshi sweatshop
workers to be killed in the entirely preventable Rana Plaza disaster
remain firmly in place.5 Installing suicide nets to prevent supply chain
1. Following Decades of Rapid Increase, Global Supply Chains Shrink, INT’L
LAB. ORG. NEWS (May 21, 2015), http://www.ilo.org/global/about-the-ilo/newsroom/
news/WCMS_370189/lang—en/index.htm [http://perma.cc/R9VG-5JL6]; Global Supply Chains, SOLIDARITY CTR., https://www.solidaritycenter.org/global-supply-chains/
(last visited Feb. 13, 2019) [https://perma.cc/9LZA-AWWL].
2. See, e.g., Jack G.A.J. van der Vorst et al., Simulation Modelling for Food Supply Chain Redesign; Integrated Decision Making on Product Quality, Sustainability
and Logistics, 47 INT’L J. PRODUCTION RES. 6611, 6612 (2009) (“We conclude that
investments in [food supply chain] design should not only be aimed at improving logistics performance, but also at the preservation of food quality and environmental
sustainability.”); Elkafi Hassini et al., A Literature Review and a Case Study of Sustainable Supply Chains with a Focus on Metrics, 140 INT’L J. PRODUCTION ECON. 69,
75, at 5.1.2 (2012) (noting that future access to capital markets may be conditioned on
sustainable practices and that sustainable practices can reach new customers); Purba
Rao & Diane Holt, Do Green Supply Chains Lead to Competitiveness and Economic
Performance?, 25 INT’L J. OPERATIONS & PRODUCTION MGMT. 898, 912 (2005) (concluding that global supply chains can deliver superior economic performance).
3. See, e.g., Michael J. Maloni & Michael E. Brown, Corporate Social Responsibility in the Supply Chain: An Application in the Food Industry, 68 J. BUS. ETHICS 35,
43 (2006). For a startling example of worker exploitation in global supply chains, see
Dennis Arnold & Kevin Hewison, Exploitation in Global Supply Chains: Burmese
Workers in Mae Sot, 35 J. CONTEMP. ASIA 319, 319–21, 330 (2005). Supply chains also
accelerate global environmental problems such as pollution, climate change, and exploitation of limited resources. Gerlinde Berger-Walliser et al., Using Proactive Legal
Strategies for Corporate Environmental Sustainability, 6 MICH. J. ENVTL. & ADMIN. L.
1, 23 (2016). These problems have caused a hardening of once voluntary corporate
social responsibility standards into legal requirements, but the long-term consequences of such hardening remain to be seen. See Gerlinde Berger-Walliser & Inara
Scott, Redefining Corporate Social Responsibility in an Era of Globalization in Regulatory Hardening, 55 AM. BUS. L.J. 167, 202–07 (2018).
4. See generally Arnold & Hewison, supra note 3; Dana Raigrodski, Creative
Capitalism and Human Trafficking: A Business Approach to Eliminate Forced Labor
and Human Trafficking from Global Supply Chains, 8 WM. & MARY BUS. L. REV. 71,
87–88 (2016).
5. Michael Safi & Dominic Rushe, Rana Plaza, Five Years On: Safety of Workers
Hangs in Balance in Bangladesh, THE GUARDIAN (Apr. 24, 2018, 1:00 AM EDT),
https://www.theguardian.com/global-development/2018/apr/24/bangladeshi-police-tar
get-garment-workers-union-rana-plaza-five-years-on [https://perma.cc/5UNS-GGBX];
Press Release, Int’l Lab. Rts. F., 5 Years After Rana Plaza, What Has Changed? (Apr.
12, 2018), https://laborrights.org/releases/5-years-after-rana-plaza-what-has-changed
[https://perma.cc/U7HC-6KXG].
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workers from throwing themselves off the factory roofs is not a longterm solution.6 Thus, finding new ways to promote sustainable global
supply chains advances a critical social good that is vital to the wellbeing of millions of people.
Scholars have concentrated on two mechanisms for fostering sustainable global supply chains. One perspective leverages contractual
governance and the role of formal legal mechanisms.7 Under this
view, sustainability problems are managed through negotiation and
enforcement of agreements, prepared outcomes for unexpected
events, and relying on formal institutions as a backdrop for performance.8 The second perspective emphasizes relational governance
through which cooperative norms such as trust, flexibility, and solidarity arise and govern the parties.9 This perspective holds that norms act
as a self-enforcing safety net against exploitation and contribute to
mutual confidence, commitment, and knowledge transfer.10 An extensive literature explores the interaction and function of contractual and
relational governance in order to solve a variety of transactional
problems.11
Yet these two mechanisms remain incomplete. Contractual governance relies on agreements that have the credible threat of enforceability.12 Suppliers often reside in jurisdictions where contract
enforcement is corrupt, weak, or absent.13 Relational governance re6. Larry Catá Backer, Realizing Socio-Economic Rights Under Emerging Global
Regulatory Frameworks: The Potential Impact of Privatization and the Role of Companies in China and India, 45 GEO. WASH. INT’L L. REV. 615, 662–64 & nn. 312–17
(2013); Larry Catá Backer, Transnational Corporations’ Outward Expression of Inward Self-Constitution: The Enforcement of Human Rights by Apple, Inc., 20 IND. J.
GLOBAL LEGAL STUD. 805, 841–44 (2013).
7. Heidi Olander et al., The Dynamics of Relational and Contractual Governance
Mechanisms in Knowledge Sharing of Collaborative R&D Projects, 17 KNOWLEDGE
PROCESS MGMT. 188, 189 (2010).
8. Laura Poppo & Todd Zenger, Do Formal Contracts and Relational Governance Function as Substitutes or Compliments?, 23 STRATEGIC MGMT. J. 707, 707
(2002).
9. Id. at 709–11.
10. Id. at 710; Yikuan Lee & S. Tamer Cavusgil, Enhancing Alliance Performance:
The Effects of Contractual-Based Versus Relational-Based Governance, 59 J. BUS.
RES. 896, 899 (2006).
11. Zhi Cao & Fabrice Lumineau, Revisiting the Interplay Between Contractual
and Relational Governance: A Qualitative and Meta-Analytic Investigation, 33 J. OPERATIONS MGMT. 15, 23 (2015) (conducting in part a meta-analysis of 149 studies
reporting correlations of contractual and relational governance); Fabrice Lumineau &
James E. Henderson, The Influence of Relational Experience and Contractual Governance on the Negotiation Strategy in Buyer-Supplier Disputes, 30 J. OPERATIONS MGMT.
382, 382–84 (2012); Lee & Cavusgil, supra note 10, at 897–98.
12. Lumineau & Henderson, supra note 11, at 394 (“This possibility (or threat) of
third-party intervention and enforcement is the primary means by which contracts
serve to exert control over the behavior of parties in an exchange.”).
13. Galit A. Sarfaty, Shining Light on Global Supply Chains, 56 HARV. INT’L L.J.
419, 425 (2015) (citing ORG. FOR ECON. CO-OPERATION & DEV., THE CORPORATE
RESPONSIBILITY TO RESPECT HUMAN RIGHTS IN SUPPLY CHAINS, 10TH OECD
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lies on conditions of trust and mutual respect. Too often, however,
lead firms and their supplier counterparts either do not trust one another or are overtly antagonistic.14 Lead firms treat their suppliers as
unreliable, and suppliers perceive lead firms as fickle and bargain-obsessed.15 The result is an environment where neither contractual tools
nor trustful relations are possible, leaving little chance for sustainability practices to penetrate the global supply chain.
How can sustainable practices be implemented when neither contractual nor relational governance can function? This question has not
been addressed in the literature and is one that this Article seeks to
answer. Building on our earlier work on precontractual investments,16
we propose a process that can transform transacting parties from a
climate of deep distrust, or even hostility, to a trusting relational partnership that invests in joint coordination, goal-sharing, and investment. Relying on a combination of trust-based initiatives, relational
investments, and the generation of shared values, a series of successful
interactions over time become the “knitting thread” by which parties
develop sustainable long-term relationships in global supply chains.17
These relationships not only generate value but also promote fairness
for participants throughout the global supply chain. This model is
summarized in Figure 1.
This work responds to various explicit calls in the literature for further research. We respond to the call that sustainable supply chain
governance, while benefiting from many empirical observations, is in
ROUNDTABLE ON CORPORATE RESPONSIBILITY DISCUSSION PAPER (June 30, 2010),
http://www.oecd.org/investment/mne/45535896.pdf); see also Michael Trebilcock &
Jing Leng, The Role of Formal Contract Law and Enforcement in Economic Development, 92 VA. L. REV. 1517, 1543–54 (2006). Without such institutions, the security of
property rights remains impaired. Avinash Dixit, Governance Institutions and Economic Activity, 99 AM. ECON. REV. 5, 5 (2009).
14. Peter Lund-Thomsen & Khalid Nadvi, Applying the Atlanta Agreement on
Child Labour in South Asia, in BUSINESS REGULATION AND NON-STATE ACTORS:
WHOSE STANDARDS? WHOSE DEVELOPMENT?, 189–200 (Darryl Reed, Peter Utting,
& Ananya Mukherjee-Reed, eds., 2012).
15. Vivek Soundararajan & Jill A. Brown, Voluntary Governance Mechanisms in
Global Supply Chains: Beyond CSR to Stakeholder Utility Perspective, 134 J. BUS.
ETHICS 83, 97 (2016); Venkatesan Baskaran et al., Indian Textile Suppliers’ Sustainability Evaluation Using the Grey Approach, 135 INT’L J. PRODUCTION ECON. 647,
648 (2012) (“The research considering conventional criteria shows the criterion of
‘price’ as the prime concern for industries.”). Li-Wen Lin, Comment, Corporate Social
Accountability Standards in the Global Supply Chain: Resistance, Reconsideration, and
Resolution in China, 15 CARDOZO J. INT’L & COMP. L. 321, 324 (2007) (“[T]he product market in the developed countries has become so competitive that multinational
companies are pressed to squeeze every penny out of their operations, including their
supply chains. Therefore, multinational companies do not have strong incentives to
consider the production processes of their suppliers in developing countries. Price is
their primary, if not only, concern.”).
16. Robert C. Bird & Vivek Soundararajan, The Role of Precontractual Signals in
Creating Sustainable Global Supply Chains, J. BUS. ETHICS (forthcoming 2020).
17. Evelyne Vanpoucke et al., Triggers and Patterns of Integration Initiatives in
Successful Buyer-Supplier Relationships, 32 J. OPERATIONS MGMT. 15, 15 (2014).
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need of further advancements in theory. One author team reviewing
the literature of sustainability governance and supply chains concluded that, “despite the multitude of empirical observations of social
and environmental reform, the literature on global chains and networks is rather weak in the theorisation of sustainability governance.”18 Further research has also been requested which recognizes
the engagement of long, multi-tier supply chains, and associated suppliers, into sustainable supply chain management.19 The literature also
needs to better understand how novel firm associations can bear fruit
and develop into long-term relationships, a promising research direction that remains insufficiently addressed.20
This work also advances the literature on trust. Exploration of trust
has taken significant root in both the law and business literatures.21
The trust literature, while rapidly maturing, has been criticized as unnecessarily pessimistic about how trust can be created in a context
where standard antecedents do not exist.22 We also respond to concerns that, while some inconsistencies have arisen in prior trust research, “[t]he most serious criticism is the . . . inability of researchers
to distinguish between the antecedents and the construct of trust itself.”23 Further, while numerous antecedents of trust have been identified,24 there is limited research on how to build relational partnerships
when the antecedents of trust are absent and active distrust may be
present. Our work also advances the understanding of the boundaries
of the trust literature as well as alternative methods of promoting cooperation when trust is absent.25
18. Simon R. Bush et al., Sustainability Governance of Chains and Networks: A
Review and Future Outlook, 107 J. CLEANER PRODUCTION 8, 16 (2015).
19. Blandine Ageron et al., Sustainable Supply Chain Management: An Empirical
Study, 140 INT’L J. PRODUCTION ECON. 168, 169 (2012) (citing Stefan Seuring & Martin Müller, From a Literature Review to a Conceptual Framework for Sustainable Supply Chain Management, 16 J. CLEANER PRODUCTION 1699 (2008)).
20. Vanpoucke et al., supra note 17.
21. See, e.g., Frank B. Cross, Law and Trust, 93 GEO. L.J. 1457 (2005); Larry E.
Ribstein, Law v. Trust, 81 B.U. L. REV. 553 (2001); Julie Juan Li et al., Active Trust
Development of Legal Senior Managers in International Subsidiaries, 59 J. BUS. RES.
73 (2006); Kirsimarja Blomqvist, The Many Faces of Trust, 13 SCANDINAVIAN J.
MGMT. 271 (1997).
22. Richard M. Locke, Presentation at the U. of Mich. Conference on Trust, Institutions, and Globalization, Building Trust 6 (Nov. 15, 2002) (M.I.T., working paper),
https://pdfs.semanticscholar.org/6436/48d319b2e8db68616dd2c06a79d5e1f8b5fd.pdf
[https://perma.cc/DRG6-S3P2].
23. Harjinder Gill et al., Antecedents of Trust: Establishing a Boundary Condition
for the Relation Between Propensity to Trust and Intention to Trust, 19 J. BUS. &
PSYCHOL. 287, 288 (2005) (citing Rajeev Bhattacharya et al., A Formal Model of Trust
Based on Outcomes, 23 ACAD. MGMT. REV. 459 (1998)).
24. Paul Goodwin et al., Antecedent and Effects of Trust in Forecasting Advice, 29
INT’L J. FORECASTING 354, 355 (2013).
25. See KAREN COOK ET AL., COOPERATION WITHOUT TRUST 196–97 (2005) (concluding that cooperation can be motivated through a variety of devices besides trust
and noting a need for a research agenda on different forms of cooperativeness).
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Part I of this Article explores the nature and consequences of global
supply chains and how lead firms and suppliers are incentivized away
from sustainable action. Part II then highlights the importance of trust
and also introduces the concept of unilateral initiatives as a mechanism by which suspicious parties can de-escalate their distrust and
form the basis for a future partnership. Part III presents the relationbuilding process, which we divide into three sequential stages of progress. Each stage applies distinct practices and leverages different
types of trust in order to build closer long-term contractual ties. Part
IV examines how trusting relations encourage sustainable global supply chains. These supply chains are both value-generating and morally
fair, encouraging both parties to invest in sustainable practices for
their own benefit.26 Part V concludes.
I. THE PRECARIOUS ENVIRONMENT OF SUSTAINABLE
GLOBAL SUPPLY CHAINS
A supply chain is a group of linked firms that pass goods and services through a coordinated value chain that results in a final product.27 At the top of the supply chain is a “lead firm,” an often large
and influential western corporation, such as a clothing chain or tech
company, that initiates and directs the flow of resources and information through the supply chain and sells product at retail.28 Beneath the
lead firm are supply chain intermediaries who connect lead firms with
suppliers, assist in component distribution, conduct advanced assembly, manage risk, and disseminate product information.29 Intermediaries serve as a bridge between the lead firm and the supplier
and transmit requirements to suppliers to meet quantity, price, and
delivery expectations.30 At the base of the supply chain reside the sup26. Takamichi Hosoda & Stephen M. Disney, The Governing Dynamics of Supply
Chains: The Impact of Altruistic Behavior, 42 AUTOMATICA 1301, 1308 (2008) (studying altruism in supply chains and finding that “an important insight from our results is
that a significant amount of benefit comes from each player in the supply chain doing
what is the best for itself and the supply chain, rather than doing what is the best for its
own selfish interests”).
27. John T. Mentzer et al., Defining Supply Chain Management, 22 J. BUS. LOGISTICS 1, 3–4 (2001). A related term, “supply chain management,” has been subjected to
numerous attempts at definition. See Dag Naslund & Steven Williamson, What in
Management is Supply Chain Management? – A Critical Review of Definitions,
Frameworks, and Terminology, 11 J. MGMT. POL’Y & PRAC. 11, 12 (2010) (reporting
results of earlier work finding 173 definitions of supply chain management).
28. Timothy J. Sturgeon, How Do We Define Value Chains and Production Networks?, 11 (M.I.T. Industrial Performance Ctr., Working Paper No. 00-010, 2001).
29. S. David Wu, Supply Chain Intermediation: A Bargaining Theoretic Framework, in HANDBOOK OF QUANTITATIVE SUPPLY CHAIN ANALYSIS: MODELING IN THE
E-BUSINESS ERA 67, 67–68 (David Simchi-Levi et al., eds., 2004).
30. Miriam M. Wilhelm et al., Sustainability in Multi-Tier Supply Chains: Understanding the Double Agency Role of the First-Tier Supplier, 41 J. OPERATIONS MGMT.
42, 43 (2016).
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pliers,31 often small factories in developing countries that perform the
initial manufacturing and fabrication with the raw materials
available.32
Sustainable practices are essential for building a just supply chain.
The modern notion of sustainability arises from the Bruntland Commission’s definition of sustainable development as “development that
meets the needs of the present without compromising the ability of
future generations to meet their own needs.”33 This definition of sustainability now includes topics such as food security, workplace safety,
economic growth, human health, and environmental impact of economic activity in both developed and developing nations.34 Sustainable development is a process of making sustainability a reality by
improving human development in a fashion that is inclusive, connected, equitable, prudent, and secure.35
Sustainable practices are now widely viewed by organizations as an
integral part of their business strategy.36 A sustainable organization
contributes to sustainable development by contributing to the economic, social, and environmental well-being of a society.37 This is considered a triple bottom line of sustainable commitment.38 Sustainable
31. In this Article, we use “suppliers” to mean entities that function at the base of
the supply chain or are otherwise distant in time, space, or intervening links from the
lead firm.
32. See Paola Perez-Aleman & Marion Sandilands, Building Value at the Top and
the Bottom of the Global Supply Chain: MNC-NGO Partnerships, 51 CAL. MGMT.
REV. 24, 25 (2008).
33. WORLD COMM. ON ENV’T & DEV., OUR COMMON FUTURE 43 (1985). In recognition of the Commission’s chairman, Gro Harlem Bruntland, the report is often
referred to as the Bruntland report or the product of the Bruntland Commission.
Hilary F. French, Reforming the United Nations to Ensure Environmentally Sustainable Development, 4 TRANSNAT’L L. & CONTEMP. PROBS. 559, 562 n.8 (1994).
34. Keith H. Hirokawa & Patricia Salkin, Can Urban University Expansion and
Sustainable Development Co-Exist?: A Case Study in Progress on Columbia University, 37 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 637, 644 (2010); Craig R. Carter & Dale S. Rogers, A
Framework of Sustainable Supply Chain Management: Moving Toward New Theory,
38 INT’L J. PHYS. DISTRIBUTION & LOGISTICS MGMT. 360, 363 (2008); Stephen Lee,
The Food We Eat and the People Who Feed Us, 94 WASH. U. L. REV. 1249, 1260
(2017).
35. Melissa J. Markley & Lenita Davis, Exploring Future Competitive Advantage
Through Sustainable Supply Chains, 37 INT’L J. PHYS. DISTRIBUTION & LOGISTICS
MGMT. 763, 764 (2007) (citing Stuart L. Hart & Mark B. Milstein, Creating Sustainable Value, 17 ACAD. MGMT. EXECUTIVE 56 (2003)).
36. See, e.g., Davide Luzzini et al., From Sustainability Commitment to Performance: The Role of Intra- and Inter-Firm Collaborative Capabilities in the Upstream
Supply Chain, 165 INT’L J. PRODUCTION ECON. 51, 51 (2015).
37. Markley & Davis, supra note 35, at 764.
38. Id.; see also Linda L. Barkacs & Craig B. Barkacs, Fair Trade in a Wal-Mart
World: What Does Globalization Portend for the Triple Bottom Line? 14 CHI.-KENT J.
INT’L & COMP. L. 1, 3–4 (2014) (summarizing the triple bottom line concept). The
triple bottom line concept was first coined by John Elkington in 1997. Id. (citing JOHN
ELKINGTON, CANNIBALS WITH FORKS: THE TRIPLE BOTTOM LINE OF 21ST CENTURY
BUSINESS 2 (1998)).
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practices amongst linked firms can only be achieved through commitment across the supply chain.39
In theory, sustainability should trickle down throughout the supply
chain. Non-governmental organizations (“NGOs”) focus significantly
on the problems generated by global supply chains. NGOs use their
coercive power to persuade businesses to implement sustainable standards.40 The United Nations Environmental Programme further coordinates with NGOs, firms, and other parties to promote sustainable
supply chain management and disseminate new approaches.41 Backed
by consumer demands for better practices,42 lead firms feel the pressure to respond in order to defend their reputation and maintain customer loyalty.43
Various frictions, however, impede the diffusion of sustainable practices. Lead firms are culturally and linguistically distant from their
suppliers, which can impede effective monitoring.44 Even without
these barriers, lead firms cannot easily evaluate or verify the sustainable practices of their suppliers because they are often geographically
distant.45 The number of suppliers can be numerous, with Walmart
having over 20,000 suppliers in China alone and Nike relying on over
8,000 suppliers spread over fifty-one countries.46
Furthermore, direct monitoring necessary to ensure sustainable
supplier practices may be so expensive that it erases the profitability
39. Luzzini et al., supra note 36, at 51 (citing Antony Paulraj, Understanding the
Relationships Between Internal Resources and Capabilities, Sustainable Supply Management and Organizational Sustainability, J. SUPPLY CHAIN MGMT., Jan. 2011, at 19.
40. See, e.g., Sarah E. Light & Eric W. Orts, Parallels in Public and Private Environmental Governance, 5 MICH. J. ENVTL. & ADMIN. L. 1, 49–50 (2015); Colin Scott,
Beyond Taxonomies of Private Authority in Transnational Regulation, 13 GERMAN
L.J. 1326, 1329 (2012).
41. Adefolake Adeyeye, The Role of Global Governance in CSR, 9 SANTA CLARA
J. INT’L L. 147, 165 (2011).
42. See, e.g., Sophia Eckert, The Business Transparency on Trafficking and Slavery
Act: Fighting Forced Labor in Complex Global Supply Chains, 12 J. INT’L BUS. & L.
383, 407–08 (2013).
43. While self-motivated transparency by organizations can introduce important
information to the public, such disclosure may remain selective and self-serving. See
David Hess, The Transparency Trap: Non-Financial Disclosure and the Responsibility
of Business to Respect Human Rights, 56 AM. BUS. L.J. 5, 41–42 (2019). Such disclosure has also been criticized for being ineffective in influencing capital markets and
investment. See Virginia Harper Ho, Nonfinancial Risk Disclosure and the Costs of
Private Ordering, 55 AM. BUS. L.J. 407, 444–56 (2018).
44. See David A. Griffith et al., An Investigation of National Culture’s Influence on
Relationship and Knowledge Resources in Interorganizational Relationships Between
Japan and the United States, J. INT’L MARKETING, Sept. 2006, at 2, 7.
45. See Miriam Wilhelm et al., Implementing Sustainability in Multi-Tier Supply
Chains: Strategies and Contingencies in Managing Sub-Suppliers, 182 INT’L J. PRODUCTION ECON. 196, 197 (2016).
46. Jason Brandenberger, Best-Laid Plans: Corporate Social Responsibility Often
Goes Awry, 3 ARIZ. J. ENVTL. L & POL’Y 1041, 1044 (2013); KAMEL MELLAHI ET AL.,
THE ETHICAL BUSINESS: CHALLENGES AND CONTROVERSIES 214 (2010).
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of the exchange.47 Final products from sustainable and unsustainable
facilities can be indistinguishable from one another.48 Lead firms cannot easily monitor factories that are geographically distant, culturally
different, and continually shifting according to order requirements.
While intermediaries can help improve efficiencies in the supply
chain, their presence discourages direct contact between lead firms
pressuring for sustainability and suppliers who utilize unsustainable
practices.
With direct monitoring impractical, lead firms often rely on proxies
that signal sustainable practices. These proxies take the form of a wide
range of sustainability certifications or standards.49 These standards
not only convey information, but they also communicate the legitimacy of the information to NGOs and consumers in an easy to understand message. The well-established certifications, such as SA8000,50
Fair Labor Association (“FLA”),51 and Business Social Compliance
Initiative (“BSCI”),52 have the power to improve a firm’s reputation
and influence consumer behavior. As a result, standards and certifications represent an attractive alternative for firms seeking sus-

47. See Aaron Greiser, Defining the Outer Limits of Global Compliance Programs: Emerging Legal & Reputational Liability in Corporate Supply Chains, 10 OR.
REV. INT’L L. 285, 311–12 (2008).
48. See Lise Skov & Janne Meier, Configuring Sustainability at Fashion Week, in
NEGOTIATING VALUES IN THE CREATING INDUSTRIES: FAIRS, FESTIVALS AND COMPETITIVE EVENTS 270, 273 (B. Moeran & J. Pedersen eds., 2011) (explaining how
sustainability is not visible in the aesthetic of fashion, but rather communicated indirectly through signals, and thus is subordinate to fashion’s dominant logic).
49. Tim Bartley, Institutional Emergence in an Era of Globalization: The Rise of
Transnational Private Regulation of Labor and Environment Conditions, 113 AM. J.
SOC. 297, 297, 303 (2007); Sebastien Mena & Guido Palazzo, Input and Output Legitimacy of Multi-Stakeholder Initiatives, 22 BUS. ETHICS Q. 527, 534 (2012).
50. SA8000 and other certification standards are offered by Social Accountability
International, a “leading social certification standard for factories and organizations
across the globe.” See SA8000® Standard, SOCIAL ACCOUNTABILITY INT’L, http://
www.sa-intl.org/index.cfm?fuseaction=Page.ViewPage&pageId=1689 (last visited
Nov. 11, 2019) [https://perma.cc/B2R9-4NQS].
51. The Fair Labor Association is a:
collaborative effort of socially responsible companies, colleges and universities, and civil society organizations, [that] create[ ] lasting solutions to abusive labor practices by offering tools and resources to companies, delivering
training to factory workers and management, conducting due diligence
through independent assessments, and advocating for greater accountability
and transparency from companies, manufacturers, factories and others involved in global supply chains.
FAIR LAB. ASS’N, http://www.fairlabor.org/ (last visited Nov. 11, 2019) [https://perma
.cc/CG6X-3NN3].
52. The Business Social Compliance Initiative “is a leading supply chain management system that supports companies to drive social compliance and improvements
within the factories and farms in their global supply chains.” What We Do, AMFORI,
http://www.amfori.org/content/what-we-do-0 [https://perma.cc/PS4E-X8Q2].
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tainability compliance and are commonly used in supply chain
monitoring.53
The attractiveness of sustainability certifications for lead firms,
however, does not necessarily translate into an attractive option for
suppliers. Although they have a useful purpose, such standards can
“break down in the dilution of buyer power, and in the web of factors
rooted in suppliers’ traditions, beliefs, local demands, and resource
dependency.”54 Additionally, lower-tier suppliers are frequently impoverished.55 Sustainability obligations can burden already fragile
suppliers with the inability to profitably meet price-driven demands.56
As sustainability pressures largely fall on highly visible lead firms,
small suppliers can view sustainable practices as unimportant to the
preservation of their brand or reputation57 or as merely a luxury of
the developed world. These attitudes, combined with pressure from
lead firms that squeeze margins and demand rapid order fulfillment,
can make sustainability demands seem like little more than tributes or
taxes levied by economic imperialists to satiate western audiences.58
From the perspective of a supplier enduring an anonymous and
hypercompetitive market, one fickle lead firm may be just like another, and there is little incentive for a supplier to make financial investments in an already precarious association. Suppliers are likely
aware that the lead firm’s monitoring costs are high, and it is unlikely
that a lead firm or a government entity will be able to locate, let alone
inspect, a wayward facility without warning.59 For example, Ban53. David Levy et al., The Political Dynamics of Sustainable Coffee: Contested
Value Regimes and the Transformation of Sustainability, 53 J. MGMT. STUD. 364, 382
(2016).
54. Soundararajan & Brown, supra note 15, at 84.
55. Id. at 96.
56. Amrou Awaysheh & Robert D. Klassen, The Impact of Supply Chain Structure
on the Use of Supplier Socially Responsible Practices, 30 INT’L J. OPERATIONS & PRODUCTION MGMT. 1246, 1250, 1261 (2010).
57. See Dima Jamali et al., Peculiar Strengths and Relational Attributes of SMEs in
the Context of CSR, 87 J. BUS. ETHICS 355, 357 (2009)
58. Farzad Rafi Khan & Peter Lund-Thomsen, CSR as Imperialism: Towards a
Phenomenological Approach to CSR in the Developing World, 11 J. CHANGE MGMT.
73, 82 (2011). The authors surveying local manufacturers concluded:
[I]t is hardly surprising that many local manufacturers experienced CSR as a
tool for extracting further economic surplus from them by their Western
buyers. The local suppliers felt that they were compelled to pay for the CSR
requirements which could be paid fully or at least partially by these customers. Western-based CSR initiatives seen in this context are thus experienced
by local manufacturers as a form of economic imperialism in which a tribute
or tax is levied on them by the Western brands, which may please their Western publics but does little or nothing to increase the earnings of supplier
firms.
Id.
59. See Mia Mahmudur Rahim, Improving Social Responsibility in RMG Industries Through a New Governance Approach in Laws, 143 J. BUS. ETHICS 807, 811–13
(2017) (describing the spotty social responsibility practices in the Bangladeshi readymade goods industry and the capacity for evasion).
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gladesh, a major source of suppliers, has only forty-six inspectors responsible for inspecting factories in the entire country. These
inspectors are also not backed by the expertise of legal counsel, which
would further facilitate enforcement.60 Even if an inspection did occur, penalties for a supplier are low, and a supplier can simply re-form
under another name or contract with another lead firm that is less
sensitive to sustainability concerns.
From the perspective of the supplier, blunt demands from the lead
firm to acquire a sustainability certificate may be interpreted as an
instruction to acquire such a certificate by any means necessary. “By
any means necessary,” however, does not incentivize genuine fulfillment of sustainability standards, but rather the acquisition of a sustainability certification through illicit means. This surreptitious
conduct creates the perception of conformance while actually subverting sustainable standards.61 Suppliers can bribe the certification
inspector or falsify written records.62 Others can purchase an illicit
certificate from the relevant standards authority and deliver it to the
lead firm directly or through an intermediary. Larger suppliers can
operate numerous factories at once, but show only a single facility for
certification inspections to the outside world.63 Regardless of the
mechanism, the result remains the same—suppliers conform to sustainability standards in name only, a practice referred to in the literature as “symbolic compliance” or “window dressing.”64
The result is a manifestation of the principal–agent problem,65
which appears when the interests of the entity giving direction (the
principal) significantly vary from the interests of the entity receiving
the instructions (the agent).66 The greater the interest divergence be60. Mia Mahmudur Rahim, Meta-Regulation Approach of Law: A Potential Legal
Strategy to Develop Socially Responsible Business Self-Regulation in Least Developed
Common Law Countries, 40 COMMON WORLD L. REV. 174, 204 (2011).
61. Soundararajan & Brown, supra note 15, at 94, 96.
62. Vivek Soundararajan et al., Small Business and Social Irresponsibility in Developing Countries: Working Conditions and “Evasion” Institutional Work, 57 BUS. &
SOC’Y. 1301, 1315–16 (2016).
63. ROBERT HANDFIELD & TOM LINTON, THE LIVING SUPPLY CHAIN: THE
EVOLVING IMPERATIVE OF OPERATING IN REAL TIME 168 (2017) (describing “show”
and “shadow factories”).
64. Soundararajan et al., supra note 62, at 1315; Fahian Anisul Huq et al., Social
Management Capabilities of Multinational Buying Firms and Their Emerging Market
Suppliers: An Exploratory Study of the Clothing Industry, 46 J. OPERATIONS MGMT.
19, 28 (2016); Petra Christmann & Glen Taylor, Firm Self-Regulation Through International Certifiable Standards: Determinants of Symbolic Versus Substantive Implementation, 37 J. INT’L BUS. STUD. 863, 864, 866 (2006).
65. Michael C. Jensen & William H. Meckling, Theory of the Firm: Managerial
Behavior, Agency Costs and Ownership Structure, 3 J. FIN. ECON. 305, 309, 312–13
(1976). See generally Eugene F. Fama & Michael C. Jensen, Separation of Ownership
and Control, 26 J.L. & ECON. 301 (1983) (examining when agents do not receive
wealth effects from their decisions in organizations).
66. Eric A. Zacks, The Moral Hazard of Contract Drafting, 42 FLA. ST. U. L. REV.
991, 998–99 (2015).
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tween principal and agent, the greater the incentive for the agent to
pursue her own ends rather than act in the principal’s best interests
when the agent is difficult to monitor.67 In the context of global supply
chains, high monitoring costs inhibiting the principal and low incentives motivating the agent propel a sustainable supply chain system
driven by perverse and self-defeating incentives. Supplier competition
shifts from achieving sustainable goals to the acquisition of a certificate, legitimate or not, at the lowest cost. Those false certifications
delivered to the lead firms are accepted and then used to deflect negative publicity. As a result, all parties are temporarily satisfied. The
lead firm obtains the certification it needs to deflect public pressure.
The supplier obtains the supply contract it wants by purchasing a false
certification. The public is placated by the misleading assurance that it
is purchasing sustainably manufactured goods. Nonetheless, genuine
sustainability problems remain unaddressed. This new state of superficial sustainability continues until an NGO, public crisis, or other shock
forces the lead firm to act again and restart the cycle.
In this environment, sustainable practices happen, to the extent
they occur at all, through deterrence-based enforcement prompted by
external forces such as NGOs demanding change.68 This approach creates a compliance “cat and mouse” game between violators of standards and those who enforce sustainable practices. This method of
ensuring sustainability is inefficient and costly. NGOs are forced to
expend valuable and limited resources investigating supply chains and
publicizing wrongdoing.69 Lead firms compelled to aggressively investigate their suppliers for sustainable practices, especially on the heels
of a scandal or a name-and-shame effort by NGOs, can provoke hostility from their suppliers and generate distrust as the overbearing lead
firm intrudes into daily operations to secure necessary audits.70 These
inspections interrupt suppliers and impose costs that are ultimately
passed back to the lead firm and eventually to the consumer.71
“Cat and mouse” compliance is not only inefficient but also erodes
the signaling power of certifications. Fake certifications dilute the legitimacy of the standard-setting market as a whole.72 Some of the
67. Id.
68. Jury Gualandris et al., Sustainable Evaluation and Verification in Supply
Chains: Aligning and Leveraging Accountability to Stakeholders, 38 J. OPERATIONS
MGMT. 1, 1 (2015).
69. Sébastien Mena & Daniel Waeger, Activism for Corporate Responsibility:
Conceptualizing Private Regulation Opportunity Structures, 51 J. MGMT. STUD. 1091,
1096 (2014).
70. D. Eric Boyd et al., Corporate Social Responsibility in Global Supply Chains:
A Procedural Justice Perspective, 40 LONG RANGE PLANNING 341, 346 (2007);
Soundararajan & Brown, supra note 15, at 96.
71. Khalid Nadvi, Global Standards, Global Governance and the Organization of
Global Value Chains, 8 J. ECON. GEOGRAPHY 323, 327 (2008).
72. Juliane Reinecke et al., The Emergence of a Standards Market: Multiplicity of
Sustainability Standards in the Global Coffee Industry, 33 ORG. STUD. 789, 810 (2012).
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more flagrant certification failures include the discovery of child labor
practices in African cocoa farms certified by UTZ and Rainforest Alliance73 and forced labor in the Fair Labor Association certified Patagonia supplier facilities in Indonesia.74 Consumers will thus be
shouldered with greater search costs in order to determine legitimate
certificates from fakes and may turn away from seeking sustainablysourced purchases altogether. Legitimately sustainable companies
may also be impacted by the “cat and mouse” environment, as the
actions of a rogue enterprise have the potential to taint the legitimacy
of an entire industry and bring into question the industry’s dedication
to sustainability overall. Therefore, “cat and mouse” compliance
serves no interest efficiently, which in turn increases the need for a
solution that can unwind these negative incentives. The following Part
introduces practices that will drive the effectiveness of our proposal.
II. TRUST AND UNILATERAL INITIATIVES
SUPPLY CHAIN MANAGEMENT

IN

In contractual environments where mutual suspicion dominates and
institutions are weak, specific tools can be used to repair relationships
and make them more productive. In this Part, we highlight the role
and importance of trust in the context of global supply chains. We also
introduce to the supply chain context the concept of the unilateral
initiative, which will be necessary for restoring lost trust.
A. The Multifaceted Role of Trust
Generally defined, trust is the “willingness of a party to be vulnerable to the actions of another party based on positive expectations regarding the other party’s motivation and/or behavior.”75 Trust can also
be defined as an expectation of regular, honest, and cooperative behavior based on common and shared norms.76 More precisely, trust “is
a particular level of the subjective probability with which an agent
assesses that another agent or group of agents will perform a particular action, both before he can monitor such action . . . and in a context
73. Child Labor and Slavery in the Chocolate Industry, FOOD EMPOWERMENT
PROJECT, http://www.foodispower.org/slavery-chocolate/ (last visited Nov. 11, 2019)
[https://perma.cc/5H3D-62TQ].
74. Gillian B. White, All Your Clothes Are Made with Exploited Labor, ATLANTIC
(June 3, 2015), http://www.theatlantic.com/business/archive/2015/06/patagonia-laborclothing-factory-exploitation/394658/ [https://perma.cc/8565-LQCA].
75. Fabrice Lumineau, How Contracts Influence Trust and Distrust, 43 J. MGMT.
1553, 1555 (2014).
76. Daryl Koehn, Should We Trust in Trust?, 34 AM. BUS. L.J. 183, 184 (1996)
(citing FRANCIS FUKUYAMA, TRUST: THE SOCIAL VIRTUES AND THE CREATION OF
PROSPERITY 26 (1995)). Koehn, in disagreeing with Fukuyama, concludes that “[i]t
may be that genuine, ethically good trust is less a matter of identical substantive positions . . . and more a matter of the trustor and trustee being committed to conversing
with one another in an effort to avoid error, self-righteousness, and bigotry.” Id. at
203.
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in which it affects his own action.”77 Trust is based on confidence in
the goodwill of another and the belief that efforts will be made that
are consistent with mutual goals.78 When an individual or entity is
considered trustworthy, the implicit assessment is made that it is sufficiently likely that the trusted party will perform an expected beneficial
(or at least non-harmful) action that is enough for the trusting party to
be willing to engage with that recipient of trust.79
Trust is believed to be an important antecedent to inter-firm cooperation.80 Trust between supply chain partners is also an important
condition for long-term supply chain relationships81 and performance.82 A trustworthy supply chain also results in increased willingness
to take risks, as exchange partners will show a greater tendency to
share the costs of risky behavior.83 Partners that trust each other will
share information84 and not behave opportunistically, even if they can
gain short-term benefits by doing so.85 Trust also builds social capital,
a valuable asset that encourages respect and reciprocity between contracting parties.86
A fundamental trait of trust is that it leaves the trusting party vulnerable to another.87 That vulnerability can manifest through a sus77. Diego Gambetta, Can We Trust Trust?, in TRUST MAKING AND BREAKING IN
COOPERATIVE RELATIONS 213, 217 (D. Gambetta ed., 1988).
78. Ken G. Smith et al., Intra- and Interorganizational Cooperation: Toward a Research Agenda, 38 ACAD. MGMT. J. 7, 11 (1995) (citing Peter Smith Ring & Andrew
H. Van de Ven, Developmental Processes of Cooperative International Relationships,
19 ACAD. MGMT. REV. 90 (1994)).
79. Gambetta, supra note 77, at 213, 217. Conversely, an entity is deemed untrustworthy when the probability of expected beneficial and reciprocal action is sufficiently low that the trusting party refrains from trust-building measures. Id. at 217–18.
80. Smith et al., supra note 78 at 10–11 (“Although research has identified many
determinants of cooperation, virtually all scholars have agreed that one especially immediate antecedent is trust.”).
81. James Hill et al., The Effect of Unethical Behavior on Trust in a Buyer-Supplier
Relationship: The Mediating Role of Psychological Contract Violation, 27 J. OPERATIONS MGMT. 281, 285 (2009).
82. Sulin Ba & Paul Pavlou, Evidence of the Effect of Trust Building Technology
in Electronic Markets: Price Premiums and Buyer Behavior, 26 MIS. Q. 243, 285
(2002).
83. Eric Fang et al., Trust at Different Organizational Levels, J. MARKETING, Mar.
2008, at 80, 82.
84. Joakim Kembro et al., Information Sharing Across Multiple Supply Chain
Tiers: A Delphi Study on Antecedents, 193 INT’L J. PRODUCTION ECON. 77, 79 (2017)
(citing various sources).
85. See, e.g., Antonio Capaldo & Ilaria Giannoccaro, How Does Trust Affect Performance in the Supply Chain? The Moderating Role of Interdependence, 166 INT’L J.
PRODUCTION ECON. 36, 37 (2015) (referring to this behavior as a source of “goodwill
trust” that develops through repeated exchanges in long-term relationships).
86. Véronica H. Villena et al., The Dark Side of Buyer-Supplier Relationships: Social Capital Perspective, 29 J. OPERATIONS MGMT. 561, 562 (2011).
87. Gregory A. Bigley & Jone L. Pearce, Straining for Shared Meaning in Organization Science: Problems of Trust and Distrust, 23 ACAD. MGMT. REV. 405, 407
(1998).
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ceptibility to defection, exit, or betrayal of the relationship.88 In the
commercial context, trust requires exposure to business risk.89 This
risk can take the form of deceitful practices, nonperformance of the
contract’s terms, or exploitation of the trusting party’s resources for
the trusted recipient’s personal gain. In environments where no trust
is necessary, there is no vulnerability, and therefore no risk.90 Trust
thus necessarily implies “action that puts its fate in the hand of the
other party.”91
Building trust has been recommended as a solution for relation-oriented inter-organizational problems,92 including in the context of implementing sustainable supply chains.93 Scholars have suggested
various trust-building mechanisms, such as promoting a willingness to
communicate,94 proactive knowledge exchange,95 and making adaptations.96 However, these trust-building efforts without more may be an
incomplete solution in an environment where price competition is significant, the absence of relationships is common, the geographical and
cultural distance is high, and suppliers have little incentive to change
their established practices. Being myopic to these conditions will lead
to trust strategies that are sub-optimally effective and unnecessarily
resource-intensive.
No less important is the understanding of the conditions and consequences of when trust is absent from a relationship. A lack of trust
between supply chain partners has been associated with negative consequences such as inefficient and ineffective performance.97 Trust and
88. Gambetta, supra note 77, at 219.
89. Linda D. Molm et al., Risk and Trust in Social Exchange: An Experimental
Test of a Classical Proposition, 105 AM. J. SOC. 1396, 1397 (2000).
90. Adam Lijeblad et al., Determinants of Trust for Public Lands: Fire and Fuels
Management on the Bitterroot National Forest, 43 ENVTL MGMT. 571, 572 (2009)
(“Risk is inherent in trusting others, but with this definition, trusting should be viewed
not as taking a risk but rather as being willing to take a risk. That is, while there can
be risk without trust, there cannot be trust without risk. If one is not vulnerable, there
is no need to trust others.”).
91. Andrew C. Inkpen & Steven C. Currall, The Nature, Antecedents, and Consequences of Joint Venture Trust, 4 J. INT’L MGMT. 1, 3 (1998).
92. Jan B. Heide & George John, Do Norms Matter in Marketing Relationships?, J.
MARKETING, Apr. 1992, at 32, 42; Ian R. Macneil, Power, Contract, and the Economic
Model, 14 J. ECON. ISSUES 909, 912 (1980).
93. Thomas Y. Choi & Janet L. Hartley, An Exploration of Supplier Selection
Practices Across the Supply Chain, 14 J. OPERATIONS MGMT. 333, 338 (1996).
94. Eva C. Kasper-Fuehrer & Neal M. Ashkanasy, Communicating Trustworthiness and Building Trust in Interorganizational Virtual Organizations, 27 J. MGMT. 235,
240 (2001).
95. See generally Lisa C. Abrams et al., Nurturing Interpersonal Trust in Knowledge-Sharing Networks, 17 ACAD. MGMT. EXECUTIVE 64, 65 (2003).
96. T.K. Das & Bing-Sheng Teng, Between Trust and Control: Developing Confidence in Partner Cooperation in Alliances, 23 ACAD. MGMT. REV. 491, 499 (1998).
97. Ik-Whan G. Kwon & Taewon Suh, Factors Affecting the Level of Trust and
Commitment in Supply Chain Relationships, J. SUPPLY CHAIN MGMT., Apr. 2004, at 4;
Keah Choon Tan, Supply Chain Management: Practices, Concerns, and Performance
Issues, J. SUPPLY CHAIN MGMT., Dec. 2002, at 42, 48.
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commitment are related to each other such that a lower level of trust
leads to a lower level of commitment between supply chain partners.98
Lack of trust also makes it impossible for partners to create innovative
value-added activities, including those related to sustainability. In addition, lack of trust creates a condition where supply chain partners
spend their time and energy on evaluating the integrity, reliability, or
trustworthiness of their partners rather than cooperatively improving
processes and operations. This in turn impairs productivity and increases agency and transaction costs.99
A lack of trust can also devolve into distrust. Distrust arises when
one party concludes that the other does not share similar key values.
Further, distrust may arise when one party concludes that disruption
of relational expectations is expected and generalizable.100 Trust and
distrust are not necessarily symmetrical, as they are the sources for
different motivations and have different implications for individual
parties and society.101 Distrust can arise in the sustainable supply
chain context when suppliers evade lead firm expectations and lead
firms engage in unfair treatment of suppliers.102 Distrust can turn an
otherwise indifferent relationship into a hostile one, whereby supply
chain participants perform the minimum necessary to complete a
transaction, refuse to invest further, and are willing to exploit the association when the opportunity arises. There is no willingness by either party to accept vulnerability in exchange for positive expectations
of behavior.103 Active distrust makes conditions in which it is nearly
impossible for trusting behavior to develop organically.
B. Unilateral Initiatives and the Power of Strategically
Conciliatory Acts
Trust alone cannot always repair a relationship, and trust is not always reciprocated merely because it is offered. Key determinant antecedents of trust, such as prior experience, habitualization, and
98. Robert M. Morgan & Shelby D. Hunt, The Commitment-Trust Theory of Relationship Marketing, J. MARKETING, July 1994, at 20, 24.
99. See generally Tan, supra note 97, at 42–53.
100. Sim B. Sitkin & Nancy L. Roth, Explaining the Limited Effectiveness of Legalistic “Remedies” for Trust/Distrust, 4 ORG. SCI. 367, 368 (1993).
101. Russell Hardin, Distrust, 81 B.U. L. REV. 495, 497–500 (2001).
102. Peter Lund-Thomsen & Adam Lindgreen, Corporate Social Responsibility in
Global Value Chains: Where Are We Now and Where Are We Going?, 123 J. BUS.
ETHICS 11, 18 (2013).
103. Mark A. Serva et al., The Reciprocal Nature of Trust: A Longitudinal Study of
Interacting Teams, 26 J. ORG. BEHAV. 625, 626 (2005); Denise M. Rousseau et al., Not
So Different After All: A Cross-Discipline View of Trust, 23 ACAD. MGMT. REV. 393,
394 (1998) (explaining that “confident expectations and a willingness to be vulnerable
are critical components of all definitions of trust reflected in the articles [in the special
issue on trust]”).
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assessment of competence, may not be available to either party.104
When these antecedents are absent, trust may not have the necessary
environment in which to develop. When a lack of trust or active distrust exists, trust must be built incrementally in order for it to be sustainable over time. In situations where trust is absent or distrust
reigns, unilateral initiatives can bridge the gap between suspicion and
solidarity.
A unilateral initiative is defined as an action that is voluntary or
conciliatory and is presented to one party for the benefit of another.105
The action is not conditioned on prior contact or the expectation of a
response from the other side. The action can be real, such as a payment or concession, or status oriented, such as an award or recognition, or a combination of both.106 Unilateral initiatives are most
effective when they are small, conciliatory, and capable of symbolism
of further engagement.107
A unilateral initiative is not a gift, but a tactical approach to bargaining. Unilateral initiatives structure the actions and counteractions
of parties in order to achieve a series of specific objectives.108 Such
objectives may be to test the other side’s reliability, clarify unresolved
questions, present a shared identity, or construct contractual norms. If
the recipient of the initiative is interested in pursuing trust-building
measures, that recipient may respond with a similarly positive signal
or act. Unilateral initiatives are based on the precept that gradual and
reciprocal initiatives by otherwise distrustful parties can decrease tension and reduce distrust such that conciliatory and trustful actions to
begin.109 The goal is to establish an initial pattern of reciprocation
based upon a practice of past conduct that can break deadlocks in
bargaining.
Unilateral initiatives have a proven track record in resolving intransigent multinational deadlocks. Unilateral initiatives have been
credited with breaking a lock-in problem between Egypt and Israel in
104. See Inkpen & Currall, supra note 91, at 3 (citing “prior cooperative relationships, habitualization, individual attachment, organizational fit, and assessment of
partner competence” as examples of antecedents of trust in the joint venture context);
Keith Blois, Are Business-to-Business Relationships Inherently Unstable?, 13 J. MARKETING MGMT. 367, 368 (1997).
105. Michael D. Large, The Effectiveness of Gifts as Unilateral Initiatives in Bargaining, 42 SOC. PERSP. 525, 526 (1999).
106. See Robert C. Bird, Defending Intellectual Property Rights in the BRIC Economies, 43 AM. BUS. L.J. 317, 350–51 (2006) (summarizing unilateral initiatives in the
international relations context).
107. Large, supra note 105, at 525.
108. Elizabeth H. Boyle & Edward J. Lawler, Resolving Conflict Through Explicit
Bargaining, 69 SOC. FORCES 1183, 1184 (1991).
109. Id. at 1184–85; see also Marc Pilisuk & Paul Skolnick, Inducing Trust: A Test of
the Osgood Proposal, 8 J. PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 121, 131 (1968) (testing
Osgood’s proposal and finding support for the effect of honest prior announcement of
moves in interaction with conciliatory steps as productive of cooperative behavior).
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the 1970s, resulting in the signing of the Camp David Accords.110 They
have also been used to de-escalate cold war tensions during the
1948–1949 blockade of West Berlin, the controversy over atmospheric
nuclear testing, the 1961 Berlin crisis over western occupation of divided Berlin, and the Cuban Missile Crisis.111 Firms have also used
unilateral initiatives in the business setting to thwart piracy threats in
emerging markets exacerbated by a government uninterested in enforcing applicable laws.112
A unilateral initiative is not the same as a “tit for tat” exchange,
which is similar to a matching-strategy whereby parties pursue a prisoner’s dilemma-type bargaining game.113 In such a game, an actor
selects the same action taken immediately in the past by the other
party. This makes actions purely dependent on recent prior conduct
and vulnerable to breakdown or devolution into a cycle of retribution.114 In addition, unilateral initiatives are neither charity nor blind
faith in better behavior. Unilateral initiatives are calculated decisions
to signal to the recipient that the sender is willing to engage in trustbuilding behavior. A firm should not leave itself so vulnerable that if
conciliatory gestures are exploited its market position would be impaired.115 If a recipient of unilateral initiatives exploits them for his or
her own advantage, the grantor of the initiatives should be prepared
to retaliate or exit the relationship.
The literature on unilateral initiatives is ripe for modern application. Early research found that the graduated reductions in tension
(“GRIT”) strategy, the intellectual predecessor to unilateral initiatives, was more effective in inducing cooperation than competitive,
reciprocal, and mixed cooperative-control strategies.116 Scholars also
found that the conveyance of “firm but reasonable” concessions to a
counterparty are generally the most effective at generating concessions in response.117 When unilateral initiatives were introduced, they
110. Bird, supra note 106, at 353–54. See generally Randolph “Michael” Nacol II,
Negotiating on Unholy Land: The Road from Israel to Palestine, 4 PEPP. DISP. RESOL.
L.J. 87 (2003).
111. Russell J. Leng, Reagan and the Russians: Crisis Bargaining Beliefs and the
Historical Record, 78 AM. POL. SCI. REV. 338, 353–54 (1984).
112. Bird, supra note 106, at 354–58 (citing John Donaldson & Rebecca Weiner,
Swashbuckling the Pirates: A Communications-Based Approach to IPR Protection in
China, in CHINESE INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY LAW AND PRACTICE 409 (Mark A. Cohen et al. eds., 1999)).
113. Samuel S. Komorita et al., Reciprocity and Cooperation in Social Dilemmas, 35
J. CONFLICT RESOL. 494, 496 (1991).
114. Bird, supra note 106, at 351–53.
115. See Boyle & Lawler, supra note 108, at 1200 (finding that “repeated instances
of no retaliation conveyed an impression of weakness, leading the subject to view the
opponent as more vulnerable to influence through punitive action.”).
116. Svenn Lindskold & Michael G. Collins, Inducing Cooperation by Groups and
Individuals: Applying Osgood’s Grit Strategy, J. CONFLICT RESOL. 679, 688 (1978).
117. See generally J.M. Chertkoff & J.K. Esser, A Review of Experiments in Explicit
Bargaining, 12 J. EXPERIMENTAL SOC. PSYCHOL. 464 (1976); Edward J. Lawler &
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resulted in greater concessions and lower hostility than a strategy of
reciprocity.118 Focusing on disparate levels of power between participants,119 scholars observed that the magnitude of unilateral initiatives
impacts their effectiveness depending on the relative power of the
grantor and recipient of the initiative.120 Further, the benefits of cooperative reciprocity were enhanced under immediately reciprocated
overtures rather than delayed responses.121 Unilateral initiatives have
been most effective in situations where, similar to the relationship between lead firm and supplier in global supply chains, significant differences in bargaining power prevent overtures from being interpreted as
a mere sign of weakness to be exploited.122
In the business context, the closest work to unilateral initiatives is
the study of assistance-giving routines.123 Assistance-giving routines
have been found to be a way to operationalize benevolent trust.124
Assistance-giving routines are also positively related to the utilization
of transaction-specific investments.125 Such routines, while useful and
having similarities to unilateral initiatives, are separate constructs. Assistance-giving routines are theorized to generate benevolent trust and
goodwill between established relationships.126 By contrast, unilateral
initiatives are designed to reduce tension between non-trusting parties
that are already antagonistic, though they can be used to build trust as
well.127 Unilateral initiatives are also more systematic in nature, akin
to arms-length bargaining rather than altruism, and incorporate the
possibility of retaliation or exit if a receiving party responds with exploitation. The strength of a unilateral initiative is its ability to generBruce K. MacMurray, Bargaining Toughness: A Qualification of Level-of-Aspiration
and Reciprocity Hypotheses, 10 J. APPLIED. SOC. PSYCHOL. 416, 434 (1980) (addressing the concession theories presented by Chertkoff & Esser, supra).
118. Boyle & Lawler, supra note 108, at 1200.
119. Edward J. Lawler et al., Unilateral Initiatives as a Conflict Resolution Strategy,
62 SOC. PSYCHOL. Q. 240, 252–53 (1999).
120. Large, supra note 105, at 525–42.
121. Komorita et al., supra note 113, at 505–06.
122. Steven Lindskold & Russell Bennett, Attributing Trust and Conciliatory Intent
from Coercive Power Capability, 28 J. PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 180, 184–85
(1973) (finding that “[w]hen the source has the clear power to arbitrarily demand
‘cooperation or else’ but chooses instead to attempt influence with a conciliatory initiative that can be exploited by the target, that initiative is evidently considered more
genuinely accommodative than it is when used without the backing of a threat.”).
123. Jeffrey H. Dyer & Wujin Chu, The Determinants of Trust in SupplierAutomaker Relationships in the U.S., Japan, and Korea, 31 J. INT’L BUS. STUDS. 259,
279 (2000); Chwo-Ming Joseph Yu et al., Formal Governance Mechanisms, Relational
Governance Mechanisms, and Transaction-Specific Investments in Supplier-Manufacturer Relationships, 35 INDUS. MARKETING MGMT. 128, 130, 132 (2006).
124. Yu et al., supra note 123, at 132.
125. Dyer & Chu, supra note 123, at 279; Yu et al., supra note 123, at 132.
126. Jeffrey H. Dyer, Examining Interfirm Trust and Relationships in a Cross-National Setting, in INNOVATIONS IN INTERNATIONAL AND CROSS-CULTURAL MANAGEMENT 222 (P. Christopher Earley & Harbir Singh eds., 2000).
127. See DAVID V. EDWARDS, INTERNATIONAL POLITICAL ANALYSIS 49–50 (1970).
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ate trust where only distrust exists, while still allowing firms to protect
their own interests.128 Nonetheless, the promising findings regarding
assistance-giving routines provide support that unilateral initiatives
would be effective in a global supply chain environment. Unilateral
initiatives thus provide a powerful tool for building sustainable global
supply chains in distrustful conditions, the subject of the next Part of
this Article.
III. BUILDING SUSTAINABLE GLOBAL SUPPLY CHAINS UNDER
CONDITIONS OF DISTRUST
Before a sustainable partnership can be developed, any distrust or
hostility must be overcome. The building blocks of trust cannot be
developed overnight. Incremental increases in trust quality can acclimate the parties to an evolving relation and minimize the chance for
opportunism or defection. This Part introduces a three-step process
that builds relations through different forms of trust and exchange.
A. Offer Unilateral Initiatives to Develop Elicitative Trust
The possibility for trust begins with the first offering of a unilateral
initiative. The lead firm, possessing the greater bargaining power and
being the least cost avoider if the initiative fails,129 is most likely to
initiate. The initiative should be a concession or overture that can be
interpreted by the trust recipient as a signal of trustworthiness or reliability. Such a concession could be the mere offering of a contract on
slightly more favorable terms than the spot market. The leader firm
could share otherwise unavailable information with the supplier that
would incrementally help that supplier achieve its production goals.
Perhaps the cheapest signal is the introduction of “cheap talk” to the
other party. Cheap talk is a statement or message from one party to
the other that does not impact the payoff from a future exchange.130
Cheap talk can consist of expressions of optimism toward a positive
outcome, assurances of reliability, cultivation of social connectivity, or
a simple expression of goodwill.131 Cheap talk is not valueless and has
been shown in a variety of experiments to influence human behavior.132 Regardless of the form of the initiative, the concession or over128. See LEROY H. PELTON, THE PSYCHOLOGY OF NONVIOLENCE 235–36 (1974).
129. Cf. Avery Katz, When Should an Offer Stick? The Economics of Promissory
Estoppel in Preliminary Negotiations, 105 YALE L.J. 1249, 1273 (1996) (noting that in
a contract context “other things being equal, the least-cost avoider is the party with
the bargaining power ex post.”).
130. Bird & Soundararajan, supra note 16.
131. Id.
132. Id. (citing Subhasish Dugar & Quazi Shahriar, Restricted and Free-Form
Cheap-Talk and the Scope for Efficient Coordination, 109 GAMES & ECON. BEHAV.
294 (2018); Nejat Anbarci et al., Information Control in Reputational Cheap Talk, 106
GAMES & ECON. BEHAV. 153 (2017); Vincent P. Crawford & Joel Sobel, Strategic
Information Transmission, 50 ECONOMETRICA 1431 (1982)).
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ture should be small in order to protect the trusting party from
opportunism. Concessions, especially at this initial stage when parties
distrust one another, have the potential to signal weakness and tempt
the recipient to exploit the trusting party.133
Such overtures do not expose the lead firm to vulnerability as the
overtures are not binding and are virtually costless to make. What
such overtures do signal is a willingness to develop the building blocks
of trust with the other party. If the lead firm is comfortable with a
concession, it can offer the opportunity to the supplier to meet its obligations through a short-term contract. Entering into, and reliance on,
a contract is not risk-free. However, in hostile environments, a shortterm contract can represent the initial step away from active mistrust.
A contract that offers stability is a trust-building measure that can
facilitate initial cooperation.134 Lead firms can offer a short-term contract that involves a longer transaction or extends beyond a single
transaction as a unilateral initiative. Such contracts would temporarily
remove the parties from the spot market and establish a commitment
for a period of time. Both sides would benefit economically from the
exchanges. Suppliers benefit from the increased stability that a multiarrangement contract brings. Lead firms benefit from the successful
completion of multiple contracts without the costs of locating and negotiating with another supplier.
Both parties are also still able to protect themselves from exploitation. If the supplier breaches the agreement, the lead firm can terminate the contract, cease association with the supplier, and exclude it
from future supply networks. If the lead firm breaks the contract, a
supplier can sue for a remedy, punish the middleman who brokered
the arrangement, disseminate negative information about the lead
firm, or withdraw permanently from further relations. The supplier
can also begrudgingly accept the broken contract but revert to the
baseline model of indifference or hostility and exploit future agreements. A jilted supplier could even retaliate by starting up an unauthorized “third shift” to produce counterfeit versions of the lead firm’s
goods. The counterfeit versions would then be sold on the market and
133. Large, supra note 105, at 530. However, in a situation where the typically more
powerful lead firm is making the concession, a weakness interpretation by the small
supplier is less likely, thereby enabling unilateral initiatives that are more significant
in nature. Id. at 539 (“[I]nitiatives by lower-power parties are more likely to be attributed to weakness, so should remain small to minimize this effect, but initiatives by
higher-power parties are less likely to suffer this interpretation, so larger initiatives
could be more effective.”).
134. See Eli Bukspan, Trust and the Triangle Expectation Model in Twenty-First
Century Contract Law, 11 DEPAUL BUS. & COMM. L.J. 379, 383 (2013) (“Just as the
contractual institution can gain much from the existence of interpersonal trust as a
cultural phenomenon, so too it can be a powerful stimuli for instilling a culture of
trust, thereby contributing to stability and predictability—important foundations in
the legal system in general and contract law in particular.”).

404

TEXAS A&M LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 7

compete with, and be indistinguishable from, their genuine
counterparts.135
If the contract is successful, a primitive association exists whereby
the lead firm and supplier can acclimatize themselves to non-exploitative exchange. In tying themselves to a contract rather than the spot
market, each side exposes initial vulnerability to accomplish the opening exchanges, a necessary condition for building trust.136 These joint
commitments generate the first and most primitive type of trust,
known as “elicitative trust.”137 Elicitative trust behavior “is motivated
by the belief or expectation that, by engaging in acts of trust themselves, one may be able to induce others to do the same.”138 Elicitative
trust anticipates a response and is predicated on the belief that a climate of deeper trust can eventually be created.139 The party engaging
in elicitative trust acts as a “first mover” who, though vulnerable to
exploitation, still persists in taking the initial action.140 A first contract
cements elicitative trust through performance. Lead firms who offer a
contract act as “trust volunteers” and influence suppliers who may be
reticent to trust lead firms because of the fear of being abused. As
lead firms and suppliers find initial contracts successful and value-generating, they may gain a certain confidence in the exchange. If the
exchanges continue, the association eventually evolves, as explained
in the next Section, toward a trust-based reciprocity.141
B. Establish Reciprocal Trust Through Recurrent Cooperation
Once unilateral initiatives are offered and contract terms fulfilled, a
contract has been performed successfully. Both sides fulfilled their ob135. PEGGY E. CHAUDHRY & ALAN ZIMMERMAN, PROTECTING YOUR INTELLECPROPERTY RIGHTS: UNDERSTANDING THE ROLE OF MANAGEMENT, GOVERNMENTS, CONSUMERS AND PIRATES 20 (2013); THOMAS MOGA ET AL., DEFENDING
INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY RIGHTS CASES IN CHINA: LEADING LAWYERS ON PROTECTING CLIENTS’ RIGHTS IN CHINA’S EVOLVING IP ENVIRONMENT 9 (2013).
136. George G. Brenkert, Trust, Morality and International Business, 8 BUS. ETHICS Q. 293, 309–11 (1998); Rousseau et al., supra note 103, at 394.
137. Roderick M. Kramer et al., Collective Identity, Collective Trust, and Social
Capital: Linking Group Identification and Group Cooperation, in GROUPS AT WORK:
THEORY AND RESEARCH 173, 186-87 (M. Turner ed., 2001).
138. Roderick M. Kramer et al., Collective Trust and Collective Action in Organizations: The Decision to Trust as a Social Decision, in TRUST IN ORGANIZATIONS: FRONTIERS OF THEORY AND RESEARCH 357, 374 (R. Kramer & T. Tyler eds., 1995).
139. Id.
140. Id.
141. Douglas A. Bosse et al., Stakeholders, Reciprocity, and Firm Performance, 30
STRATEGIC MGMT. J., 447, 454 (2009); Ranjay Gulati, Does Familiarity Breed Trust?
The Implications of Repeated Ties for Contractual Choice in Alliances, 38 ACAD.
MGMT. J. 85, 105 (1995) (concluding that “[o]bserving interfirm alliances over time
suggests that repeated ties between firms engender trust that is manifested in the form
of the contracts used to organize subsequent alliances.”); Ranjay Gulati, Social Structure and Alliance Formation Patterns: A Longitudinal Analysis, 40 ADMIN. SCI. Q. 619,
646 (1995) (observing an interactive effect between social structure and alliance
formation).
TUAL
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ligations to the terms. The supplier showed its reliability to the lead
firm. The lead firm displayed its willingness to source from this supplier. Each party benefits from the emerging certainty of the performance and is relieved of transaction costs arising from finding a new
partner, renegotiating the contract, and adapting to new patterns of
performance.
Now the exchange has the potential to become regularized. Contractual performance is not merely an exercise in repetition. Repeated
exchange propagates shared values that nurture the emerging relation.142 The importance of repeated exchanges in contracts has been
often emphasized.143 For example, one study of buyer-supplier exchanges concluded that “the presence of a historic pattern of exchange with a supplier raises the value to the buyer of selecting that
supplier, even when procuring well-specified, highly standardized
parts in a setting geared toward cost reductions.”144 The authors also
concluded that “partner-specific knowledge or routines and relational
contracts between organizations develop in a history-dependent way
and may comprise valuable, if intangible, relational assets as well.”145
Repeated exchange also reduces monitoring costs and risk of defection. As exchanges continue, partners learn one another’s behavior,
and consequently, how to optimally monitor each other.146 This in
turn reduces the cost of monitoring, as parties learn which methods
are inefficient and drop those in favor of efficient routines.147 Repeated exchanges reduce defection by influencing anticipations about
the future. Parties in repeated exchange come to expect, and perhaps
rely on, that exchange. This in turn nudges attitudes towards cooperation and away from conflict in order to preserve that anticipation.148
Cooperation, in turn, encourages other values that increase the cost of
defection. Cooperation improves contractual flexibility because parties can better adapt to unexpected disruptions to the exchange. Repeated exchange and the associated investments encourage a
142. Bosse et al., supra note 141, at 449. See also Yanfeng Zheng & Haibin Yang,
Does Familiarity Foster Innovation? The Impact of Alliance Partner Repeatedness on
Breakthrough Innovation, 52 J. MGMT. STUD. 213, 227 (2015) (finding that under certain conditions, familiarity with partners can encourage breakthrough innovations).
143. Ranjay Gulati & Maxim Sytch, Does Familiarity Breed Trust? Revisiting the
Antecedents of Trust, 29 MANAGERIAL & DECISION ECON. 165, 185 (2008); Laura
Poppo et al., When Can You Trust “Trust”? Calculative Trust, Relational Trust, and
Supplier Performance, 37 STRATEGIC MGMT. J. 724, 726 (2016).
144. Daniel W. Elfenbein & Todd R. Zenger, What is a Relationship Worth? Repeated Exchange and the Development and Deployment of Relational Capital, 25 ORG.
SCI. 222, 223–24 (2014).
145. Id. at 224.
146. Sylvain Chassang, Building Routines: Learning, Cooperation, and the Dynamics of Incomplete Relational Contracts, 100 AM. ECON. REV. 448, 453 (2010).
147. Id.
148. W. Bentley MacLeod, Can Contract Theory Explain Social Preferences? 97
AM. ECON. REV. 187, 191 (2007).
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willingness to adapt to the evolving exchange that spot market participants would typically decline.149
Repeated exchange also improves communication and the sharing
of information. Communication and information sharing in turn can
increase the intensity of trust in commercial transactions.150 This increased trust is particularly potent when parties share the experience
of successful past cooperation between them.151 Repeated exchanges
also erode cultural biases that may be held by the parties in crosscultural settings.152 Lead firms and suppliers often hail from different
cultures and hold different attitudes that can impact how they interact
with one another.153 As the parties deal with one another over time,
actual experience overrides stereotypes and promotes further
cooperation.154
As a result of repeated exchanges and associated shifts in attitudes
and practices, a more evolved level of trust emerges known as “reciprocal trust.” Reciprocal trust is a type of trust that forms when a party
observes another’s actions, reciprocates, and reconsiders its attitudes
and conduct in subsequent conduct.155 Reciprocal trust is more developed than trust that relies merely on anticipated exchange. Reciprocal
trust is an active process that relies on prior trust demonstrations,
does not demand sharp equivalence, and begins to allow for flexibility
in the relation and a focus on the long-term. The process of reciprocal
trust is also dynamic and can grow depending on the attitudes, attributes, and behaviors embedded in the exchange.156 This leads to a condition in which the lead firm and supplier at this stage are now
familiar with one another, stabilize their reputation judgments about
one another, and solidify the emerging relation.157
149. Poppo & Zenger, supra note 8, at 711.
150. Jeffrey H. Dyer & Wujin Chu, The Role of Trustworthiness in Reducing Transaction Costs and Improving Performance: Empirical Evidence from the United States,
Japan, and Korea, 14 ORG. SCI. 57, 66 (2003); Nirmalya Kumar, The Power of Trust in
Manufacturer-Retailer Relationships, HARV. BUS. REV., Nov.–Dec. 1996, at 92, 100.
151. Christian Fischer, Trust and Communication in European Agri-Food Chains,
18 SUPPLY CHAIN MGMT 208, 212–13 (2013).
152. See Elfenbein & Zenger, supra note 144, at 239 (noting conditions under
which relational capital is most likely to form under conditions of repeated exchange);
Yadong Luo, Contract, Cooperation, and Performance in International Joint Ventures,
23 STRATEGIC MGMT. J. 903, 917 (2002).
153. See Gareth R. Jones & Jennifer M. George, The Experience and Evolution of
Trust: Implications for Cooperation and Teamwork, 23 ACAD. MGMT. REV. 531,
540–41 (1998).
154. Timothy L. Fort, Trust and Law’s Facilitating Role, 34 AM. BUS. L. J. 205, 211
(1996).
155. Serva et al., supra note 103, at 625–48.
156. Roger C. Mayer et al., An Integrative Model of Organizational Trust, 20
ACAD. MGMT. REV. 709, 728 (1995); Serva et al., supra note 103, at 625–48.
157. Simone Mariconda & Francesco Lurati, Does Familiarity Breed Stability? The
Role of Familiarity in Moderating the Effects of New Information on Reputation Judgments, 68 J. BUS. RES. 957, 962 (2015).
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C. Sustain Relational Trust with Relation-Specific Investments
At this stage, the exchange evolves from trusting contractually to
trusting relationally. Lead firms and suppliers evolve from discrete to
relational contracts because they are comfortable and familiar with
their values, interactions, and operations. A relational contract is a
shared understanding under which parties develop a robust relationship that evolves beyond the formal contract terms.158 Parties in relational contracts emphasize mutual planning, solidarity, commitment,
and particularly vigorous trust in defining and maturing their relations.159 Relational parties expect future cooperative behavior, anticipate changing needs to modify the contract, and are more tolerant of
problems when they arise.160 These values, in addition to the formal
terms of the contract, establish norms that maintain and deepen the
relationship.161 The parties may tolerate suboptimal deviations from
expectations in the short term in order to preserve the greater overall
value that will be generated from the enduring relation.162
Relational contracts encourage relation-specific investments. Each
side has the trust and capacity to make these investments, which counters the tendency in spot market contracting to suppress relation-specific investments to inefficiently low levels.163 Such investments in
human and site-specific assets also build trust and increase supplier
responsiveness.164 Suppliers may invest in special equipment that increases the efficiency of the lead firm’s distinct production process.
They may also invest in knowledge management mechanisms that better manage the demands of lead firms. In response to specific schedules imposed by the lead firm, the supplier may allocate labor and
capital resources to better satisfy those specific requirements. The
supplier may also hire workers who are specifically skilled for their
158. Scott Baker & Albert Choi, Contract’s Role in Relational Contract, 101 VA. L.
REV. 559, 560–61 (2015); Benjamin Means, A Contractual Approach to Shareholder
Oppression Law, FORDHAM L. REV. 1161, 1195–96 (2011).
159. See Robert C. Bird, Employment as a Relational Contract, 8 U. PA. J. LAB. &
EMP. L. 149, 151 (2005).
160. Poppo & Zenger, supra note 8, at 721–22; Richard E. Speidel, Characteristics
and Challenges of Relational Contracts, 94 NW. U. L. REV. 823, 829 (1999); Ian R.
Macneil, Contracts: Adjustment of Long-Term Economic Relations Under Classical,
Neoclassical, and Relational Contract Law, 72 NW. U. L. REV. 854, 905 (1978) (noting
that in relational contracts, the “[p]ossibility of trouble [is] anticipated as normal part
of relation, to be dealt with by cooperation and other restorational techniques.”).
161. Lumineau & Henderson, supra note 11, at 383.
162. David A. Griffith et al., Social Exchange in Supply Chain Relationships: The
Resulting Benefits of Procedural and Distributive Justice, 24 J. OPERATIONS MGMT. 85,
87 (2006).
163. Vincent P. Crawford, Relationship-Specific Investment, 105 Q. J. ECON. 561,
571 (1990).
164. Robert B. Handfield & Christian Bechtel, The Role of Trust and Relationship
Structure in Improving Supply Chain Responsiveness, 31 INDUS. MARKETING MGMT.
367, 375–76 (2002).
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needs and plan hiring to accommodate the lead firm’s periods of
greatest demand.
Lead firms, for their part, invest by designing their distribution
strategies to leverage efficiencies generated by a dedicated set of suppliers. Investments in infrastructure, either at the supplier’s facility or
between the facility and a transport hub, increase speed and lower
transportation costs. Lead firms tailor their payments to suppliers’ resource needs to ensure suppliers can smoothly meet their own financial obligations. Lead firms also share managerial knowledge and
other information with the supplier in order to improve production
standards.165 These investments made by lead firms and suppliers are
not based merely on blind faith, but are calculated decisions validated
by the concrete evidence of trust and commitment displayed by suppliers and lead firms in prior interactions.
An advantage of these relation-specific investments for the parties
is that they are not easily commoditized in the wider market. A relationship is not a piece of equipment; it cannot be simply purchased on
the spot market to neutralize a competitor’s market advantage. It requires a genuine commitment by the parties to invest in the relationship. Such investments demand giving up immediate gains, require
long-term thinking, and are party-dependent. Returns on investment
are also dependent on the relationship’s continuation.166 These returns become ties that bind and encourage continued investment and
commitment to social action.167 The investments in these relations are
also specialized and difficult to replicate, a cornerstone for achieving
competitive advantage over rivals.168
The result of these investments is a higher level of trust known as
“relational trust.” Relational trust arises when lead firms and suppliers engage in repeated interactions over time.169 Past reliability generates positive expectations about future performance.170 Parties will
have significant motivation to continue the relationship, even in the
face of occasional problems in performance.171 Relationally trusting
parties display goodwill, good faith, and honesty toward one another.172 Core values between partners are more closely aligned.173
Attachments may form that express some modicum of empathy for
165. Hau L. Lee et al., The Value of Information Sharing in a Two-Level Supply
Chain, 46 MGMT. SCI. 626, 640 (2000).
166. Crawford, supra note 163, at 564–65.
167. See generally THOMAS DONALDSON & THOMAS W. DUNFEE, TIES THAT BIND:
A SOCIAL CONTRACTS APPROACH TO BUSINESS ETHICS (1999).
168. Jay Barney, Firm Resources and Sustained Competitive Advantage, 17 J.
MGMT. 99, 107–11 (1991)
169. Rousseau et al., supra note 103, at 399.
170. Id.
171. Rousseau et al., supra note 103, at 400 (“Unmet expectations can be survived
when relational trust exists, particularly if parties make an effort to restore a sense of
good faith and fair dealing to their interactions.”).
172. See Rousseau et al., supra note 103, at 399–400.
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the reciprocating partner.174 Relational trust is positively associated
with supplier performance, especially when investments in supplierspecific assets occur in the relation.175
Relational trust can alleviate hold-up problems.176 Hold-up
problems arise when the return on a firm’s relation-specific investments are ex post expropriable by its trading partner.177 Relation-specific investments typically place the investor in a vulnerable position.
A lead firm that has made relation-specific investments in a relationship with a supplier, such as infrastructure construction or sharing
managerial expertise, can find those investments lost when the supplier leaves the relation in search of better terms elsewhere. Conversely, after a supplier has made such investments, a lead firm can
renege its promise to purchase and, via efficient breach of contract,
find better terms on the spot market. Attempts to protect those interests by contracts alone can constrain, but not eliminate, opportunism.178 Established trust and relational norms can alleviate the holdup problem by discouraging defection and thus encouraging those relation-specific investments that, in combination with relational planning, add long-term value.
Parties sharing relational trust can also benefit from improved information exchange. Suppliers reduce their need to continuously
check for other business opportunities and need only have contingency plans in case the lead firm defects. This, in turn, lowers their
cost of production which can be passed on to the lead firm. Suppliers
can also better manage just-in-time and other time-based practices
more efficiently as the trustworthy lead firms are expected to uphold
payment and other commitments. Like suppliers, lead firms will then
spend fewer resources on contingency planning that protects against
defection. The likelihood that lead firms will punish a supplier or exclude a supplier from the supply chain due to wrongdoing will also
decrease. Such reduced monitoring is based on both trust in the trading partner and self-interest in conserving resources. Information
173. Poppo et al., supra note 143, at 724; Peter S. Ring, Fragile and Resilient Trust
and Their Roles in Economic Exchange, 35 BUS. & SOC’Y 148, 164 (1996).
174. Rousseau et al., supra note 103, at 399.
175. Poppo et al., supra note 143, at 736–37. The authors also found that calculative
trust also influences supplier performance under certain conditions. Id.
176. Ernan Haruvy et al., Relationship-Specific Investment and Hold-Up Problems
in Supply Chains: Theory and Experiments, 12 BUS. RES. 45, 67 (2018), https://
link.springer.com/article/10.1007/s40685-018-0068-0 [https://perma.cc/8AUL-KEEC]
(“[T]he hold-up problem can be effectively mitigated in settings in which the relationship is not one shot.”). See also Bengt Holmström & John Roberts, The Boundaries of
the Firm Revisited, 12 J. ECON. PERSP. 73, 80–81 (1998).
177. Holmström & Roberts, supra note 176, at 74 & n.2.
178. Stephen M. Bainbridge, Corporate Decisionmaking and the Moral Rights of
Employees: Participatory Management and Natural Law, 43 VILL. L. REV. 741, 813
(1998); Holmström & Roberts, supra note 176, at 83.
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quality overall, which includes relevance, accuracy, reliability, and
timeliness from the supplier, also improves for the lead firm.179
Lead firm and suppliers have come a long way from their previous
state of mutual mistrust and reliance on the spot market. Once relational exchange has taken firm hold, sustainable practices are a natural consequence. The next Part shows how sustainable practices in
relation-based supply chains can create value and enhance fairness for
the parties involved.
IV. TOWARD EFFICIENCY AND FAIRNESS THROUGH SUSTAINABLE
GLOBAL SUPPLY CHAINS
As discussed in the previous Section, parties in relation-based
global supply chains experience a variety of benefits from that relationship. A lack of trust and the risk of defection are minimized. Communication is open and productive, enabling greater agility should
changes be needed in production, as well as allowing for easier resolution of problems when they arise. Each party can expend fewer resources monitoring the other for compliance. Hold-up problems are
discouraged by the incentives of cooperation. Overall, the supply
chain becomes streamlined in a fashion that is not easily replicated by
competitors.
With distrust problems minimized and value generated from the relation-based supply chain, the parties have the opportunity to invest in
sustainable practices. Sustainable practices in supply chains are not
merely altruistic endeavors, but also offer meaningful benefits to both
lead firms and suppliers in global supply chains. This Part analyzes
how sustainable practices in trust-based supply chain relationships can
deliver both value and fairness for the individual parties involved.
A. Sustainable Practices in Global Supply Chains Generate Value
Although some argue that the concept of value is so vague as to be
indefinable,180 the meaning of value in the organizational context is
based upon the worth of a given resource in the firm.181 A resource in
a firm becomes valuable if it “exploit[s] opportunities or neutralize[s]
threats in a firm’s environment.”182 Value originates when a firm can
achieve goals at lower costs than its competitors.183 Value is also found
179. See Helena Forslund & Patrik Jonsson, The Impact of Forecast Information
Quality on Supply Chain Performance, 27 INT’L J. OPERATIONS & PRODUCTION
MGMT. 90, 93 (2007) (citing Paul M. Clikeman, Improving Information Quality, INTERNAL AUDITOR, June 1999, at 32–33).
180. Ralph Barton Perry, The Definition of Value, 11 J. PHIL. PSYCH & SCI. METHODS 141, 143–45 (1914).
181. Cliff Bowman & Véronique Ambrosini, Value Creation Versus Value Capture:
Toward a Coherent Definition of Value in Strategy, 11 BRIT. J. MGMT. 1, 2 (2000).
182. Barney, supra note 168, at 106.
183. Margaret A. Peteraf, The Cornerstone of Competitive Advantage: A Resourcebased View, 14 STRAT. MGMT. J. 179, 180–81 (1993).
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in organizations when their resources enable implementation of new
strategies that improve efficiency and effectiveness.184
Sustainable practices generate value for organizations. First, sustainable practices generate value through product differentiation.185
Rankings of brands according to sustainability are readily available
online.186 A majority of customers would be willing to switch to a
brand with similar price and quality traits if it is one that supports a
good cause.187 Corporate citizenship is now a significant factor for
consumers in their buying decisions.188 When customers learn of socially responsible behavior by an organization, attitudes toward their
products become more positive.189
Second, sustainable practices can prevent the unexpected nameand-shame embarrassments that arise from NGO investigations and
disclosure of poor business practices.190 Proactively avoiding scandal
is more cost-effective than suffering public condemnation and repairing a tarnished reputation. Firms tend to have limited awareness of
how to repair reputational damage,191 leaving an enduring taint of
corporate misbehavior on organizations that lasts well beyond the fervor of the initial scandal.192 With reputation management a high priority for corporate leaders,193 proactive investments in sustainable
practices can minimize exposure to scandals that can be highly damaging for any organization. Conversely, such investments can also generate public approbation. For example, when McDonalds raised the
price of the 15 million tomatoes it purchases annually by just a penny
per pound in order to promote sustainable migrant work, it nearly

184. Barney, supra note 168, at 106.
185. See ERIC LOWITT, THE FUTURE OF VALUE: HOW SUSTAINABILITY CREATES
VALUE THROUGH COMPETITIVE DIFFERENTIATION 188–92 (2011).
186. See, e.g., RANKABRAND, https://rankabrand.org/ (last visited Feb. 12, 2019)
[https://perma.cc/UR6K-3SLP]. For an example of a detailed review of a highly
ranked sustainable enterprise, see How Sustainable is Lebensbaum – Tee?, RANKABRAND (Jan. 19, 2019), https://rankabrand.org/tea-brands/Lebensbaum+-+Tee [https://
perma.cc/6RMR-LP6Y].
187. C.B. Bhattacharya & Shankar Sen, Doing Better at Doing Good: When, Why,
and How Consumers Respond to Corporate Social Initiatives, 47 CAL. MGMT. REV. 9,
9 (2004).
188. Id.
189. Xueming Lo & C.B. Bhattacharya, Corporate Social Responsibility, Customer
Satisfaction, and Market Value, 70 J. MARKETING, Oct. 2006, at 1, 1.
190. Markley & Davis, supra note 35, at 767.
191. Laura Poppo & Donald J. Schepker, Repairing Public Trust in Organizations,
13 CORP. REP. REV. 124, 124 (2010).
192. Ronald Sims, Toward a Better Understanding of Organizational Efforts to Rebuild Reputation Following an Ethical Scandal, 90 J. BUS. ETHICS 453, 468 (2009)
(“When compared to a race, rebuilding reputation is often more like a marathon than
a sprint. Unfortunately there is no completion date.”).
193. Id. at 454.
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doubled the pay received by those workers and generated positive
publicity and approval.194
Third, firms pursuing sustainable practices attract talented job applicants. When Dutch IT firm Capgemini faced the difficult challenge
of filling 800 information technology and management consulting positions in the Netherlands, it eschewed traditional recruitment incentives in its recruiting surveys.195 Instead of awarding respondents with
a t-shirt or coffee mug for participating, Capgemini promised to fund
a week of housing and schooling for impoverished Indian children.196
Nearly 10,000 people responded to the survey, 2,000 submitted viable
resumes to Capgemini, and 800 candidates were quickly screened, interviewed, and hired.197 Traditional compensation packages of attractive salaries and benefits are no longer sufficient to attract the best
talent.198 Young people entering the workforce—the future managers
and leaders of organizations—are more concerned about the ethical
values of their employers than prior generations.199 Over threequarters of Millennials would even consider taking a pay cut to work
for a socially responsible enterprise.200 This effect is not confined to
Millennials,201 with studies finding in various contexts that sustainable
business practices attract competitive talent to the organization.202
194. Markley & Davis, supra note 35, at 767. See also Steven Greenhouse, In Florida Tomato Fields, a Penny Buys Progress, N.Y. TIMES (Apr. 24, 2014), https://www
.nytimes.com/2014/04/25/business/in-florida-tomato-fields-a-penny-buys-progress.html
[https://perma.cc/362N-73NR].
195. Adrienne Fox, Corporate Social Responsibility Pays Off, SOC’Y HUM. RESOURCE MGMT. (Aug. 2, 2007), https://www.shrm.org/hr-today/news/hr-magazine/
pages/0807cover.aspx [https://perma.cc/K5P8-2DZ3].
196. Id.
197. Id. at 45–46.
198. Id. at 43 (“By being good corporate citizens, companies can woo top talent,
engage employees and raise productivity.”).
199. Matthew Jenkin, Millennials Want to Work for Employers Committed to Values and Ethics, GUARDIAN (May 5, 2015, 5:26 EDT), https://www.theguardian.com/
sustainable-business/2015/may/05/millennials-employment-employers-values-ethicsjobs [https://perma.cc/94D9-97AZ].
200. CONE COMMC’NS, 2016 CONE COMMUNICATIONS EMPLOYEE ENGAGEMENT
STUDY 5 (2016).
201. For an example of research performed before Millennials entered the
workforce, see Rich Strand et al., Organizational Entry Preferences Based Upon Social and Personnel Policies: An Information Integration Perspective, 27 ORG. BEHAV.
& HUM. PERFORMANCE 50, 50 (1981) (studying influence of pay, individual development, environmental responsibility, and fair employment practices on prospective job
applicants).
202. See, e.g., Mohamad Abu Huzaifah bin Magbool et al., Corporate Sustainable
Practices and Talent Attraction, 7 SUSTAINABILITY ACCT. & POL’Y J. 539, 553–54
(2016) (finding that “organizations with high [corporate sustainable business
(“CSB”)] practices are perceived to be more attractive than organizations with lower
CSB practices, and that job applicants’ intention to join and accept a job offer are
positively associated with an organization’s CSB practices.”); Kristin B. Backhaus et
al., Exploring the Relationship Between Corporate Social Performance and Employer
Attractiveness, 41 BUS. & SOC’Y 292, 312 (2002) (“Overall, our results indicate that
potential job seekers are interested and concerned about a firm’s record of corporate
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Fourth, sustainable practices toward others continue to impact a
firm’s workforce even after being hired by the firm. Previous studies
have proposed that when potential employees perceive that their organization treats others fairly or behaves in a socially and environmentally responsible manner, there is a greater likelihood that they
will exhibit positive attitudes and behaviors.203 Moreover, employees
that perceive their organizations as dedicated to socially responsible
practices have a substantially increased level of organizational commitment.204 This effect is so strong that it exceeds the influence of job
satisfaction on commitment levels.205 Employees perceiving active
corporate citizenship by their employers also report better engagement, connectivity, and creative involvement in the firm.206 Sustainable practices may also positively influence retention,207 employee
identification with the firm,208 and meaningfulness of work.209
Fifth, suppliers can benefit from the stability that relation-based
sustainable practices bring. When a lead firm has found a trustworthy
supplier, it is less likely to arbitrarily choose another supplier because
social performance when considering firms as prospective employers.”). The authors
also found “somewhat suprising[ly]” that “issues that would seem to be most salient
to job seekers, those issues that have a direct relationship to their daily lives, were less
important than broader issues” such as corporate social performance. Id. at 313.
203. Sean Valentine & Gary Fleischman, Ethics Programs, Perceived Corporate Social Responsibility and Job Satisfaction, 77 J. BUS. ETHICS 159, 166 (2008) (finding that
“perceived CSR plays a mediating role in the relationship between ethics programs
and job satisfaction”); Deborah E. Rupp et al., Employee Reactions to Corporate Social Responsibility: An Organizational Justice Framework, 27 J. ORG. BEHAV. 537,
539–40 (2006) (theorizing that employee perceptions of corporate social responsibility
influence emotions, attitudes, and behaviors).
204. Stephen Brammer et al., The Contribution of Corporate Social Responsibility
to Organizational Commitment, 18 INT’L J. HUM. RESOURCE MGMT. 1701, 1714 (“The
empirical results suggest that employee perceptions of corporate social responsibility
have a major impact on organizational commitment.”). There are three forms of organizational commitment: “affective commitment which denotes ‘an emotional attachment to, identification with, and involvement in the organization’ . . . ; continuance
commitment which denotes ‘the perceived costs associated with leaving the organization’; and normative commitment ‘which reflects a perceived obligation to remain in
the organization.’ ” Id. at 1703.
205. Id. at 1714.
206. Ante Glavas & Sandy Kristin Piderit, How Does Doing Good Matter? Effects
of Corporate Citizenship on Employees, 36 J. CORP. CITIZENSHIP 51, 64 (2009).
207. See David A. Coldwell et al., The Effects of Person–Organization Ethical Fit
on Employee Attraction and Retention: Towards a Testable Explanatory Model, 78 J.
BUS. ETHICS 611, 614 (2008) (“The essential point is that an individual’s attraction to
and retention in a company can be at least partly explained by individual and organizational value matches and mismatches and that some of these matches and mismatches reside in perceptions of CSR.”).
208. Hae-Ryong Kim et al., Corporate Social Responsibility and Employee—Company Identification, 95 J. BUS. ETHICS 557, 564–65 (2010); Abraham Carmeli et al.,
The Role of Perceived Organizational Performance in Organizational Identification,
Adjustment and Job Performance, 44 J. MGMT. STUD. 972, 984 (2007). High organizational identification in turn improves job performance. Id.
209. Ante Glavas & Ken Kelley, The Effects of Perceived Corporate Social Responsibility on Employee Attitudes, 24 BUS. ETHICS Q. 165, 184–85 (2014).
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the lead firm will have to build trust all over again. That, in turn,
grants the supplier a stable contractual relationship with a single firm.
Stability is an important need for suppliers who produce under tight
margins and deadlines for delivery.210 Such suppliers deliver their
batch to the middlemen (or large suppliers), tier-one suppliers, or
sourcing agents.211 The batch is then sent to lead firms.212 A supplier’s
survival depends on being flexible and conforming to ever-changing
production demands. In addition, survival for a supplier, particularly a
small supplier in a competitive industry, is subject to significant volatility arising from economic forces outside its control.213 Stability for a
supplier can deliver a steady income, promote planning, and encourage the hiring of a consistent workforce. Workers for the supplier
can have increased security that their employment will continue beyond the immediate term.
Finally, sustainable practices allow suppliers to lift themselves out
of poverty. A supplier, through its successful and sustained interaction
with its lead firm, may develop sufficient capabilities that enable it to
move up the global supply chain. A supplier initially skilled in raw
material manufacturing may develop proficiency of assembly, coordination, quality control, or other more advanced processes. As the supplier moves up the chain, it potentially becomes more tied to the lead
supplier, further augmenting the trust and relation-specific investments between the parties. Suppliers performing more sophisticated
tasks may also generate greater margins for themselves and be able to
provide better salaries and working conditions. The ultimate step may
be a supplier’s vertical integration with the lead firm, which neutralizes exploitation, prevents haggling, and unifies assets under a single
sustainable governance structure.214
B. Sustainable Practices in Global Supply Chains Promote Fairness
Fairness is a fundamental concern of sustainable development, with
intragenerational and intergenerational equity essential to sustainable
practices.215 Fairness in sustainability invokes just access to cultural
210. See Soundararajan & Brown, supra note 15, at 95–97.
211. See id.
212. See id.
213. Thomas Y. Choi & Yunsook Hong, Unveiling the Structure of Supply Networks: Case Studies in Honda, Acura, and DaimlerChrysler, 20 J. OPERATIONS MGMT.
469, 490 (2002) (discussing examples of small suppliers facing relentless pressure to
cut costs).
214. See generally Francine Lafontaine & Margaret Slade, Vertical Integration and
Firm Boundaries: The Evidence, 45 J. ECON. LITERATURE 629 (2007) (examining optimal conditions and consequences of vertical integration decisions); OLIVER E. WILLIAMSON, THE ECONOMIC INSTITUTIONS OF CAPITALISM 85–130 (1985).
215. Christopher B. Barrett, Fairness, Stewardship and Sustainable Development, 19
ECOLOGICAL ECON. 11, 12–13 (1996).
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resources and the distribution of welfare.216 The perception of fairness
is a significant force in supply contracts.217 For example, participants
in supply chains have a strong aversion to inequality—because fairness concerns regarding resource scarcity and distribution generally
have a significant impact.218 Consumers will also respond negatively to
evidence of price unfairness in the exploitation of others.219
Two types of fairness evolve through relation-oriented partnerships.
The first type is procedural fairness, which refers to “the perceived
fairness of the means used.”220 Procedural fairness encompasses the
criteria for making unbiased, ethical, transparent, and correctable decisions.221 Procedural fairness involves the number of safeguards and
other opportunities for the participant to engage in a fair process to
evaluate the propriety of a particular decision.222 These safeguards
can include consistent application, freedom from bias, use of accurate
and objective information in the decision-making process, incorporation of various stakeholder concerns, and a mechanism to correct
flawed outcomes.223 Procedural fairness is closely tied to relationbased contracting, with suppliers more likely to alleviate conditions of
poverty in procedurally fair environments.224 For example, a study of
farmers found that procedurally fair conditions of transparent and
verifiable product and pricing criteria enabled suppliers to reduce uncertainty and more effectively manage their production process.225
Sustainable practices in global supply chains enhance fairness for all
participants, but in particular, for organizations at the base of the supply chain.
Procedural fairness is less influential in competitive markets because a dissatisfied firm can simply exit the relationship and choose
another partner. However, firms that have made relational-specific in216. See David Throsby, Cultural Sustainability, in A HANDBOOK OF CULTURAL
ECONOMICS 183, 183–84 (Ruth Towse ed. 2003).
217. Elena Katok & Valery Pavlov, Fairness in Supply Chain Contracts: A Laboratory Study, 31 J. OPERATIONS MGMT. 129, 136 (2013) (showing how fairness concerns
influence the behavior of supply chain members); Tony Haitao Cui et al., Fairness and
Channel Coordination, 53 MGMT. SCI. 1303, 1309–10 (2007) (similar).
218. Katok & Pavlov, supra note 217, at 131.
219. Maurice E. Stucke, Looking at the Monopsony in the Mirror, 62 EMORY L.J.
1509, 1557 (2013).
220. Robert Folger & Mary A. Konovsky, Effects of Procedural and Distributive
Justice on Reactions to Pay Raise Decisions, 32 ACAD. MGMT. J. 115, 115 (1989).
221. Boyd et al., supra note 70, at 343.
222. See Larry A. DiMatteo et al., Justice, Employment, and the Psychological Contract, 90 OR. L. REV. 449, 466 (2011); Yadong Luo, Procedural Fairness and Interfirm
Cooperation in Strategic Alliances, 29 STRAT. MGMT. J. 27, 27 (2008).
223. Katherine V.W. Stone, Procedural Justice in the Boundaryless Workplace: The
Tension Between Due Process and Public Policy, 80 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 501,
508–09 (2005) (listing key criteria that define procedural fairness).
224. Jorge A. Rodrı́guez et al., NGOS’ Initiatives to Enhance Social Sustainability in
the Supply Chain: Poverty Alleviation Through Supplier Development Programs, J.
SUPPLY CHAIN MGMT., July 2016, at 83, 101.
225. Id. at 100–01.
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vestments can lose those investments from unfair behavior. Thus, supply chain participants benefit from introducing rules and processes
that objectively evaluate conduct. For example, a supplier and lead
firm could agree that a supplier may not be dismissed without an opportunity to be heard. This opportunity gives the supplier time to resolve any disagreements before the firm terminates the supplier.
Procedural fairness in contract disagreements also gives the supplier
notice and an opportunity to be heard. The recognition of someone’s
dignity and importance through implementation of protective
processes enhances feelings of positive social standing and engagement in the relationship overall.226 Conversely, disrespect or impolite
treatment, such as the denial of procedural fairness, encourages feelings of disconnection and vulnerability by the other party.227 Trust and
familiarity developed in supply chains discourage denial of such fairness, not only because of the cost of exiting the relationship, but also
due to the increased likelihood of supply chain members perceiving
one another more humanely.
Procedural fairness need not only be used to curb arbitrary decision-making, but can also be leveraged to encourage positive conduct.
Procedural fairness can reward consistent and superlative conformance to deadlines and quality standards with special recognition. This
“reward power” is contingent on positive outcomes and encourages
internalization of the desired norms between lead firm and supplier.228
These processes may impose costs, but they do so for the benefit of
increasing loyalty and product quality while discouraging opportunism
and defection. Ultimately, greater procedural justice may be more effective than monitoring in increasing supplier compliance.229
Distributive fairness refers to “the material outcomes for the various parties of a pattern of allocation.”230 Outcomes that are distributively fair are expected to narrow, or at least not widen, the existing
inequality between the parties.231 Distributive fairness can be cultivated through equitable treatment across suppliers, whereby lead
firms, through their middlemen, avoid favoritism and make standards
objective, achievable, and verifiable.232 Suppliers that perform well
can be rewarded with awards, bonuses, continued and, perhaps, deep226. Tom R. Tyler & E. Allan Lind, A Relational Model of Authority in Groups, in
ADVANCES IN EXPERIMENTAL SOCIAL PSYCHOLOGY 115, 141 (Mark P. Zanna ed.,
1992).
227. Id.
228. See id. at 118.
229. Boyd et al., supra note 70, at 348.
230. Bosse et al., supra note 141, at 450; DiMatteo et al., supra note 222, at 466–67.
231. Cf. Richard W. Parker, The Use and Abuse of Trade Leverage to Protect the
Global Commons: What We Can Learn from the Tuna-Dolphin Conflict, 12 GEO.
INT’L ENVTL. L. REV. 1, 80 (1999) (describing substantive fairness in international law
context).
232. See Baskaran et al., supra note 15, at 648–51 (summarizing literature on supplier evaluation methods).
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ening partnerships, and being entrusted with more critical, complex,
or demanding work. Through repeated exchange, sustained communication, and trust, relational contracts facilitate this fairness that encourages parties to share knowledge, sustain commitment, and plan
for the long-term.233 By contrast, firms that impose distributive unfairness in supply chains risk retribution in the form of financial and social penalties. Distributive unfairness contributes significantly to
inefficiencies and coordination failures in supply chains. This is especially problematic when fairness concerns are not shared amongst
members of the supply chain.234
Although normative concepts, such as fairness and justice, primarily
benefit the supplier, they also have value for the lead firm. Fairness
also has positive impacts on supply chain performance235 and is influenced by contract design.236 The increased complexity of a contract,
which can be useful in defining contingencies and future planning,
generates improved performance when procedural fairness is present.237 When substantive fairness is part of a contract, it encourages
contractual stability and recurring performance of the contract’s
terms.238 Fairness in supply chains also enhances the loyalty of members within that supply chain to increase continued participation.239
Authors studying fairness concluded that, “fairness is critical to effective governance” and should have an impact on contract performance
for both parties.240 Unfair behavior in supply chains, by contrast, can
be the source of defections and punitive behavior that can have a
boomerang effect against the lead firm.241

233. Griffith et al., supra note 162, at 94–95; Yi Liu et al., How Does Justice Matter
in Achieving Buyer-Supplier Relationship Performance?, 30 J. OPERATIONS MGMT.
355, 364 (2012).
234. See Katok & Pavlov, supra note 217, at 136.
235. Id.; Christoph H. Loch & Yaozhong Wu, Social Preferences and Supply Chain
Performance: An Experimental Study, 54 MGMT SCI. 1835, 1842 (2008).
236. See Teck-Hua Ho et al., Distributional and Peer-Induced Fairness in Supply
Chain Contract Design, 23 PRODUCTION & OPERATIONS MGMT. 161, 173 (2014).
237. Laura Poppo & Kevin Zheng Zhou, Managing Contracts for Fairness in BuyerSupplier Exchanges, 35 STRATEGIC MGMT. J. 1508, 1512, 1521 (2014). See generally
Kevin E. Davis & Helen Hershkoff, Contracting for Procedure, 53 WM. & MARY L.
REV. 507, 511 (2011) (exploring the justice and spillover implications of “contract
procedure” which the authors define as “the practice of setting out procedures in
contracts to govern disputes that have not yet arisen.”).
238. Poppo & Zhou, supra note 237, at 1512–13, 1521–22.
239. Thani Jambulingam et al., How Fairness Garners Loyalty in the Pharmaceutical Supply Chain, 3 INT’L J. PHARMACEUTICAL & HEALTHCARE MARKETING 305, 315
(2009).
240. Poppo & Zhou, supra note 237, at 1521.
241. See Nirmalya Kumar et al., Interdependence, Punitive Capability, and the Reciprocation of Punitive Actions in Channel Relationships, 35 J. MARKETING RES. 225,
231–32 (1998).
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V. CONCLUSION
While sustainable global supply chains are an aspiration for millions, sustainable supply chains are still far from a consistent reality.
One of the most important frictions preventing sustainable practices is
the absence of trust between lead firms and suppliers. In the absence
of trust, enforcing sustainable standards is difficult and costly, with
lead firms having a limited ability to gather evidence and suppliers
having readily available mechanisms to circumvent sustainable
obligations.
This Article proposes a method by which lead firms and suppliers
can foster relation-based arrangements, even when trust is absent between the parties. We draw on the concepts of unilateral initiatives
and trust to explore how different types of trust can develop over time
between lead firms and suppliers. This trust can eventually enable
them to make sustainable investments with a reduced risk of shirking
or hold-ups. Sustainable practices become a value-generating asset for
the supply chain, enabling members of the supply chain to outperform
rivals. Sustainable practices also enhance fairness for all supply chain
members, especially those most vulnerable at the base of the supply
chain.
Global supply chains are a powerful value-creating mechanism.
However, they are also vulnerable to exploitation of suppliers and
mismanagement of resources. This Article proposes a mechanism by
which supply chain participants in hostile environments can de-escalate their suspicions, build productive relationships, and enhance
value and justice for all parties concerned.
FIGURE 1. Building Trust and Sustainability in
Global Supply Chains

